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SPEAKING OF THE WORLD: Fact, Opinion and

the Originality Standard of Copyright
Alan L. Durham*

I. INTRODUCTION

"The world does not speak. Only we do."
So said post-modernist
philosopher Richard Rorty. 1 Rorty's epigram occurs in a discussion of truth,
mind and language, yet it recalls a persistent problem in copyright law. The
world does not speak, but authors speak of the world. When they speak of the
world, what do they own by copyright? The question is most difficult in the
case of factual works. Whether they are histories, scientific treatises, travel
guides or telephone books, such works, in a manner of speaking, hold up a
mirror to the world. What is captured in the reflection is attributable, in part,
to the author's labor and genius; the world does not, after all, speak for itself.
Yet, if the mirror is an accurate one, the truths revealed are properties of the
world. The author did not create those truths, and in that sense is not the
"author" of those truths. Hence, if the author's work is copyrighted, to what
extent can the author claim those truths as his own, and prevent others, for the
duration of the copyright, from reproducing them?
Philosophers might find the mirror analogy naive, 2 yet it gives us a place to
start. Copyright extends to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression." 3 Works of authorship may communicate facts, but
facts themselves are not copyrightable. 4 If I write, "In 1970, the population of

Assistant Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. J.D. 1988, University of
California, Berkeley. I would like to thank the University of Alabama Law School Foundation and
Dean Kenneth Randall for their generous support. I am also grateful for the contributions and
criticisms of Robert Denicola, Mark Lemley, Wythe Holt, Norman Stein, David Epstein and Dan
Filler.
1.

RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 6 (1989).

2.
See infra Part IV.A.
3.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). Works of authorship include, among other things, literary and
dramatic works, musical works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, sound recordings and architecture. Id.
4.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991) ("That there can be
no valid copyright in facts is universally understood. The most fundamental axiom of copyright law
is that 'no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates."' (quoting Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985))); Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today
Publ'g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Facts, without more, are not copyrightable.").
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others may reproduce that fact, even if

the population is known only because I walked the streets of Princeton,
knocking on doors and counting every inhabitant. 6 On the other hand, if I

clothe that fact in distinctive rhetoric of my own, I can prevent others from
copying my "expression."' 7 In this way, the law strikes a balance. My
language, of which I am truly the "author," is something I own, but the fact
may be reported by others who are obliged only to develop their own

"expression." In a sense, I own the mirror, not the reflection.
In practice, copyright cases seldom deal with the appropriation of
individual facts or the language in which individual facts are expressed. They
more often deal with collections of facts, where § 103(a) of the Copyright Act
Section 103(a) extends copyright protection to
comes into play.

"compilations," defined in § 101 as "work[s] formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship."
Because all compilations are "selected,
coordinated, or arranged" in some manner, 9 claims based on compilations raise
one of the most fundamental questions in copyright law: What constitutes an
"originalwork of authorship?"
5.
1 borrow this fact, with respect and apologies, from Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in
Collections of Fact: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLuM. L. iWv.
516, 524 (1981).
6.
See Denicola, supra note 5, at 525.
The population figure that emerges from this exercise is not an original work of
authorship in the same sense as a painting or novel. We are unaccustomed to
speaking of Darwin, for example, as the "originator" of evolution, or Rutherford
as the "author" of the proton. We are instead inclined to label such contributions
"discoveries," implying that the existence of the information is not dependent on
the efforts of its discoverer. The census taker has in this sense "copied" the
population figure from the world around him. This aspect of the work does not
owe its origin to the author, and hence lies beyond the traditional sphere of
copyright.
Id.
7.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348 ("[I]f the compilation author clothes facts with an original
collocation of words, he or she may be able to claim a copyright in this written expression. Others
may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not the precise words used to present them.");
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) ("[N]o author may
copyright facts or ideas.
The copyright is limited to those aspects of the work--termed
'expression'--that display the stamp of the author's originality."). If there are only a few ways to
communicate a particular fact, as is perhaps true of this example, even the expression may be denied
copyright protection under the doctrine of "merger." See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
8.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).
9.
Even collections which include every element in a given universe of facts (e.g., a telephone
number for every resident of a city) are "selected" in the sense that the author has chosen the
boundaries of the universe (e.g., the city rather than the county). The author's choice to omit nothing
is also a kind of "selection." Even a random ordering might be considered an "arrangement," if it
were consciously chosen. Whether such "selection" and "arrangement" count for purposes of
copyright law depends on how one defines an "original work of authorship."
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The Supreme Court addressed this question in the Feist case, which
considered the copyrightability of a white pages telephone directory.' 0 The
compilers of the directory did not invent the numbers; they merely reported the
facts." They may have expended considerable labor in assembling those facts,
but Feist firmly rejected any copyright claim based on their "sweat of the
brow."' 12 Instead, the Court imposed the standard of "originality," which it
termed the "sine qua non of copyright."' 3 An "original" work, it said, is one
"independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works),
[which] possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.' 4 Facts
themselves are not "original," existing independently of their discoverers, but
a compilation of facts may be "original," if the selection, coordination and
arrangement of facts exhibits a faint spark of creativity. 15 The Court held
that
6
the alphabetical arrangement of telephone listings lacked such a spark. '
Feist was an important step forward in the treatment of factual works. It
ended the debate over whether the industrious collection of facts could itself
support a copyright in the collection, and it identified a dose of "creativity" as
an essential element of originality. 17 However, subsequent cases examining
other compilations, such as price guides and pitching forms, have exposed a
missing term in the Feist equation: If originality requires "creativity," what is
"creativity?" Specifically, if the "facts" included in a compilation are in part
the product of the author's subjective judgment, in contrast to "hard facts" like
telephone numbers, does that element of judgment make the compilation, or
even its constituent "facts," original and copyrightable? If, for example, the
Feist directory had listed not telephone numbers but life expectancies, and
otherwise had maintained the selection, coordination and arrangement of the
original directory, would the compilation have been "original?" Or should
copyright law treat differently the kind of creativity involved in estimating a
life span and the kind involved in expressing any information in a particular
manner?
It is not a minor point. Originality is, as the Supreme Court said, the "sine
qua non of copyright."' 8 It separates what can be owned by copyright, for the
prolonged period of the life of the author plus seventy years,19 from what
10

Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
I1. Id.at 343.
12. Id. at 353.
13.
Id. at 345.
14. Id.
15.
Id. at 358-59.
16. Id. at 362.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.at 345.
19.
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The term for anonymous works and works
made for hire is 120 years from the date of creation, or 95 years from the date of first publication,
whichever expires first. Id. § 302(c). Prior to the passage of the Copyright Term Extension Act in
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cannot be owned at all, or what can be owned only under the more rigorous
standards, and shorter duration, of the patent monopoly. Given the perception
of some that intellectual property rights recently have expanded far beyond
their proper sphere, 20 this separation is deserving of careful attention. The
balance struck in Feist seems, in the more recent cases, to have been
misunderstood or ignored.
Feist drew the boundary of copyrightable subject matter, or "original"
authorship, between "creation" and "discovery.", 2 1 In factual works-works
that describe aspects of the world in which we live-"creation" generally
includes the author's choice of language, arrangement of materials, and
selection of materials to include or exclude.22 These are choices made at the
author's discretion. They are not imposed by an order found in the world, but
reflect the author's judgment as to how and what to communicate to his
audience. Together, these choices produce the kind of original "expression"
traditionally protected by copyright. "Discovery" includes any information
about the world communicated through the medium of the author's expression.
Sometimes that information is "original" in the sense that it has never been
communicated before, but it is not "original" in the sense that the author made

1999, the term of copyright was the life of the author plus 50 years, or, for anonymous works and
works made for hire, 100 years from the date of creation or 75 years from the date of first publication.
Id. §§ 302(a), (c) (amended 1998).
In 1948, Ralph Brown observed that "[un an acquisitive society, the drive for monopoly
20.
advantage is a very powerful pressure. Unchecked, it would no doubt patent the wheel, copyright the
alphabet, and register the sun and moon as exclusive trademarks." Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising
and the Public Interest, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1206 (1948). The patent system has recently come under
fire for granting rights to inventions that seem excessively broad, abstract or unoriginal. See, e.g.,
James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44. Particularly in the business
arena, patents are now awarded to inventions having only dubious connections to the constitutionallyreferenced "useful arts." See Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L
REV. 1419, 1421 (1999). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998), and the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998), raise similar concerns over the tightening grip of copyright. See David Nimmer, A R ff
on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000). Trademark
rights have recently been recognized in distinctive colors, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514
U.S. 159 (1995), odors, In re Clarke, 1990 TTAB LEXIS 53 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 19, 1990), restaurant
decors, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), and comedic punchlines,
Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200 (ND. Ga. 1995). Perhaps we have come closer
to Professor Brown's vision of "unchecked" acquisitiveness than he could have imagined. See Mark
A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 898 (1997).
(T]here is currently a strong tendency to ',ropertize" everything in the realm of
information. Intellectual property law is expanding on an almost daily basis as
new rights are created or existing rights are applied to give intellectual property
owners rights that they never would have had in an earlier time.
Id.
21. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
22. Id. at 358.
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it. 23 If the information is accurate, the 24author found it. Such information,
according to Feist,belongs to the public.
This distinction has broken down in recent cases, which would characterize
as copyrightable subject matter observations that are subjective, uncertain or
opinionated, even though they attempt to be, and purport to be, accurate
These cases subvert the Feist definition of
reflections of the world.
"originality"-the "sine qua non of copyright"-and upset the balance
between private ownership and the public domain. Indeed, so few facts are
entirely free of subjectivity and opinion, one questions the continuing vitality
of Feist's prohibition against copyrighting facts. At the very least, the courts
have created a significant problem of line drawing, with little theoretical
I propose, therefore, a return to the Feist standard of
justification.
copyrightable "originality," with the understanding that even subjective facts
are not subject to copyright protection. To the extent that public policy
demands a reward for the compilers of such facts (and that may or may not be
the case), new legislation must be crafted that strikes the right balance to
advance the public interest. The long duration and low thresholds of copyright
may be appropriate for traditional "expression," but quite inappropriate for
facts, no matter how "opinionated."
In Part II of this article, I review the perennial tensions in copyright law
born of the effort to separate copyrightable expression from uncopyrightable
Any effort to define copyrightable
ideas, discoveries and procedures.
originality in the context of "opinionated" factual works must conform to, or at
least co-exist with, the traditional framework discussed in this section. In
Part III, I examine Feist and other cases dealing with the concept of
originality. I have organized this section according to the kinds of works
examined-from directories, which afford little room for opinion except in the
choice of material to include, to works which speculate about the past, predict
These cases provide a number of
the future or deliberately mislead.
perspectives on a common problem; namely, how can one separate what is
original to the author, and copyrightable, from what the author merely
discovers in the world, when the author's work is the product of a complex
interaction between creation and observation. In Part IV, I propose a
refinement, or re-affirmation, of the Feist standard of originality, to permit
copyright protection for individual ways of communicating facts, while
denying copyright protection to facts themselves, even when they are
"opinionated" facts. If we follow the contrary path suggested by the recent
cases, we may give to authors who speak of the world too much of the world
of which they speak.

23.
24.

Id. at 347-48.
Id. at 348.
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II. CONUNDRUMS AND DICHOTOMIES
Like other fields of intellectual property law, the law of copyright is
characterized, to a large extent, by the balancing and tension of opposing
principles. Much of the conflict, or equipoise, of these principles can be traced
to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, which is the
source of congressional authority to enact both patent and copyright laws. It
provides Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 25 Historians and legal
scholars find in this sentence two parallel threads-one relevant to patent law
("[t]o promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for limited times to
.. . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries") and the other
relevant to copyright law ("[t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . by
securing for limited times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . .
Writings"). 26 "Science," in the eighteenth century, meant knowledge or
learning,
rather than the narrower field of inquiry to which "science" refers
27
today.
As made explicit in the copyright laws, the "exclusive Right to their
Writings" includes the rights of authors to reproduce, distribute, perform or
28
adapt their works. These exclusive rights advance the progress of knowledge
by ensuring that authors will reap the financial reward of their efforts, and
consequently will have an incentive to undertake such efforts in the first
place.29 Compared to other means by which governments could encourage
progress, such as prizes to worthy authors, the exclusive rights model has the
advantages of simplicity, efficiency and self-regulation. 30 Yet the Constitution
holds that authors' rights can endure only for "limited times," 31 and the stated
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. See Durham,supra note 20, at 1425-26; EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE
PROGRESS OF THE USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at
60-61 (1998); Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 51 (1949-1950).
27. Lutz, supra note 26, at 51 ("The word 'science,' which comes from the Latin scire, 'to
know,' at the writing of the Constitution meant learning in general."); Arthur H. Seidel, The
Constitutionand a Standardof Patentability,48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 5, I (1966).
28.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
29. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) ("The rights
conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for
their labors.").
30. In other words, the authors whose efforts are, in the judgment of the marketplace, most
worthy will be most richly compensated.
31.
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (referring to the parallel patent
language as "both a grant of power and a limitation"). The Constitution may impose further limits
simply through the implicit meanings of the words "author" and "writing," particularly when
contrasted with the words "inventor" and "discovery." On the other hand, some argue that Congress
is better situated than the courts to define the nature of "progress" and to determine, as a matter of
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purpose of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science" implicitly disallows any
grant of rights hostile to that purpose. One might suppose that the strongest
rights inevitably "promote the Progress" most effectively, but the copyright
laws, like the "limited times" provision in the Constitution itself, reflect an
understanding that the most effective policy lies in a middle ground, where
authors' rights are strong enough to provide the required incentive, but not so
strong that the public-the intended beneficiary of the intellectual property
laws 32 -is denied the greatest possible enjoyment, and productive use, of
authors' labors. 33
The built-in tensions between ownership and access, incentive and
enjoyment, underlie certain "dichotomies" which are fundamental to the
subject matter of copyright.
These include the idea/expression dichotomy
and the fact/expression dichotomy. A third, for the sake of uniformity, I will
call the process/expression dichotomy, although it is not generally expressed
in those terms. Each of these dichotomies has some bearing on the question of
"originality," so I will discuss them in turn in the following subsections,
relying in large part on the seminal cases still cited by courts and academics.
A. The Idea/ExpressionDichotomy
The idea/expression dichotomy has its statutory basis in § 102(b) of the
Copyright Act, which provides that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for
an original work of authorship extend to any idea... regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.",34 The
task of identifying an "idea" and distinguishing it from the protectable
elements of a work of authorship has been left to the courts. In Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp.,35 decided in 1930, Judge Learned Hand said nearly
all that can be said. His remarks laid down the analytical framework still
employed today, while candidly admitting its shortcomings. The plaintiff had
written a play, entitled "Abie's Irish Rose," which concemed the romance of a
Jewish boy and a Catholic girl-a match opposed by their respective families,
but ending in a happy reconciliation. 36 The defendant's motion picture, "The
policy, how it is best achieved. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat?" Copyright and Other Protection
of Works of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 378 (1992).
32. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546 ("'The monopoly created by copyright.., rewards the
individual author in order to benefit the public."' (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984))).
33.
The principle of "fair use," for example, circumscribes the rights of authors by allowing
their works to be reproduced without permission under limited circumstances. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1994).
34.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). Section 102(b) also denies copyright protection to "any . . .

procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery."
35.
45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
36.
Id. at 120-21.

Id

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

Cohens and the Kellys," told a similar tale, but in this instance the genders
were reversed and a stolen fortune played a significant role in the plot. 37 The
works were similar in outline, but differed in many details. The question was
whether the works shared anything more than unprotectable "ideas. 38
One might say that texts employing different language have nothing in
common but ideas. To use a short example, if the sentence "Attorneys enjoy
stamp collecting" is changed to "Lawyers like philately," one could argue that
the "expression" has changed because the words have changed; perhaps
nothing remains but the "idea" of associating a certain profession with a
certain hobby. Judge Hand held that copyright protection cannot be limited to
specific language: "It is of course essential to any protection of literary
property... that the right cannot 39be limited to the text, else a plagiarist would
escape by immaterial variations.
To call such protection "essential" may be an overstatement, 40 but
copyright that could be avoided by minor changes would be of limited value.
On the other hand, if copyright does not extend to ideas, there must be some
way for a second author to convey the same ideas as a first author without
liability for infringement. Judge Hand saw the problem in terms of the varying
"levels of abstraction" in which a work can be characterized:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," 41
to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.
The difference between unprotectable "ideas" and protectable "expression"
is one of specificity. If works are similar only at a general level, they share
only ideas; if they are similar at a more specific level, though not necessarily
the level of precise wording,42 they may share expression. This is more a way

37. Id.
38. Id. at 12 1. Judge Hand assumed, for the sake of argument, that copying had occurred. Id.
at 120.
39. Id. at 121.
40. Copyright "limited literally to the text" would protect authors against the easiest and least
expensive forms of plagiarism, such as reproduction by a photocopier. It would not stop "plagiarists"
who took pains to re-phrase the original work. If the latter sort of copying were permitted,
presumably the author's expectation of financial recovery would be so undermined that the "Progress
of Science" would be hindered.
41.
Nichol4 45 F.2d at 121.
42. Or the equivalent level of expression for non-textual works.
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of formulating the problem than it is a solution,43 and Judge Hand admitted
that the boundary between idea and expression can never been drawn with
certainty. 44 Still, he had little difficulty finding the similarities between
"Abie's Irish Rose" and "The Cohens and the Kellys" so general that they
could not be considered similarities of expression.4 5
Today the work scrutinized under the "levels of abstraction" microscope is
as likely to be a computer program as a play,46 yet the line between idea and
expression still eludes precise definition.4 In the case of a dramatic work, the
broad outlines of a story are likely to be considered its "idea." More specific
plot twists or elements of character development may be considered
"expression" protected from copying. 48 Although distinguishing idea and
expression sounds like a metaphysical issue, it is characterized more
commonly as a matter of policy, based upon what best promotes the "Progress
of Science." 49 Ultimately, "idea" is whatever a court regards as so general
that it belongs in the public domain; "expression" is whatever
remains. 50 Courts are guided more by intuition than by rigorous analysis, and
43. As Judge Easterbrook observed, "[s]ometimes called the 'abstractions test,' Hand's insight
is not a 'test' at all. It is a clever way to pose the difficulties that require courts to avoid either
v.
extreme of the continuum of generality. It does little to help resolve a given case .... "Nash
CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990).
44. "Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." Nichols, 45 F.2d
at 121.
45. Id. at 121-22.
46. See. e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703-07 (2d Cir. 1992)
(applying an idea/expression analysis to copyrighted computer programs); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252-54 (3d Cir. 1983).
47. Appeals to the "ordinary observer" have been of little assistance. Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540.
Who is the "ordinary" observer, and how does this person choose the level of
generality? Ordinary observers, like reasonable men in torts, are fictitious
characters of the law, reminders that judges must apply objective tests rather
than examine their own perceptions. They do not answer the essential question:
at what level of generality? After 200 years of wrestling with copyright
questions, it is unlikely that courts will come up with the answer any time soon,
if indeed there is "an" answer, which we doubt.
Id.
48. For example, in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 49-56 (2d Cir.
1936), Judge Hand found copyright infringement in the duplication of various incidents in a tale of
murder.
49. Ginsburg, supra note 31, at 346.
In copyright law, an "idea" is not an epistemological concept, but a legal
conclusion prompted by notions-often unarticulated and unproven--of
appropriate competition. Thus, copyright doctrine attaches the label "idea" to
aspects of works which, if protected, would (or, we fear, might) preclude, or
render too expensive, subsequent authors' endeavors.
Id.
50. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
The guiding consideration in drawing the line is the preservation of the balance
between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws.
What is basically at stake is the extent of the copyright owner's monopoly-
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as Learned
Hand confessed late in his career, the decisions are inevitably "ad
51
hoc."
Nichols also discusses the position of authors as unwitting contributors to
the public domain.5 2 "Abie's Irish Rose" may have contained original ideas,
and those ideas, rather than any particular expression, may have been the
source of whatever success the play achieved. 53 Although Judge Hand
doubted whether the ideas were original, he held it "irnmaterial. ' 5 4 'Though
55
the plaintiff discovered the vein [of ideas], she could not keep it to herself.",
Her copyright protected her expression, but "not ... everything that might be
drawn from her play; its content went to some extent into the public
domain. 56 As Judge Easterbrook observed sixty years later, the consignment
of ideas to the public domain is a part of the balancing of opposing interests
that advances, or is intended to advance, the progress of knowledge." To
include ideas within the ambit of copyright might encourage original thinking,
but it would hinder the process by which authors build upon the work of their
predecessors.
Intellectual (and artistic) progress is possible only if each author
builds on the work of others. No one invents even a tiny fraction of
the ideas that make up our cultural heritage. Once a work has been
written and published, any rule requiring people to compensate the
author slows progress in literature and art, making useful
expressions "too expensive", forcing authors to re-invent the wheel,
and so on. Every work uses scraps of thought from thousands of
predecessors, far too many to compensate
even if the legal system
58
were frictionless, which it isn't.
The trick is to encourage a first author, without too much discouraging a
second. 59 The idea/expression dichotomy is one means of striking that
balance.

from how large an area of activity did Congress intend to allow the copyright
owner to exclude others?
Id.; see also Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
51.
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); see also
Herbert Rosenthal, 446 F.2d at 742 ("At least in close cases, one may suspect, the classification the
court selects may simply state the result reached rather than the reason for it.").
52.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures, Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
53.
Id. at 122.
54. Id.
55.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1541-42 (7th Cir. 1990).
58.
Id. at 1540.
59. See id. at 1541.
At each instant some new works are in progress, and every author is
simultaneously a creator in part and a borrower in part. In these roles, the same
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An important addendum to the idea/expression dichotomy is the concept of
"merger," discussed in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian.60
Sometimes an "idea" can be expressed in only a small number of ways. In
HerbertRosenthal, the court found that to be true of the plaintiff's idea of a
jewel-encrusted pin in the shape of a bee.61 The plaintiff (or, at any rate,
plaintiffs counsel) could not suggest any ways in which the same idea could
be expressed without the result being substantially similar to the plaintiffs
expression.62 In this circumstance, idea and expression are "inseparable," 63
and if the expression were to be protected by copyright, the idea of the jeweled
bee pin would be locked up as well: "When the 'idea' and its 'expression' are
thus inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not be barred, since protecting
the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea'
upon the copyright owner ....

B. The Fact/Expression Dichotomy and the Concept of "Originality"
The fact/expression dichotomy is in many respects similar to the
idea/expression dichotomy, and courts sometimes treat the two as a unitary
principle.65 Both are concerned with identifying and protecting only an
author's "expression," and both find support in § 102(b) of the Copyright
Act. 66 But there are important differences to consider. First, as already
discussed, the line between idea and expression is one of specificity. 67 As
person has different objectives. Yet only one rule can be in force. This single
rule must achieve as much as possible of these inconsistent demands.
Id.
446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 197 1).
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 742.
Id. See also Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967).
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that the "topic
necessarily requires," if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited
number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by
copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of the
substance. ... We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the
public can be checkmated.
Id. (citations omitted).
65. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991)
("[Clopyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build
freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work. This principle, known as the
idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship." (citation omitted)).
66. "Section 102(b) is universally understood to prohibit any copyright in facts." Feist, 499
U.S. at 356. That prohibition lies in the reference to "discoveries:" "In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any ... discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id
67. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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authors work out the details of their conceptions, their efforts 'pass
imperceptibly from unprotected idea to protected expression. This is not true
of the fact/expression dichotomy. Facts cannot be copyrighted, no matter how
detailed, arcane or even trivial they may be. Second, the line between idea and
expression lies primarily, if not exclusively, within the abstract realm of
intellect. Without straying too far into Rorty's territory, both idea and
expression seem products of the mind. The line between fact and expression
lies, or purports to lie, between the mind and the world-that is, between what
is created by the author and what is, at most, discovered by the author. This
distinction promises a more concrete boundary between fact and expression
than between idea and expression. 69
The fact/expression dichotomy is closely tied to the concept of
"originality."
Section 102(a) defines the subject matter of copyright as
"original works of authorship. 70 In Feist, the Supreme Court held that
"originality" is also a constitutional requirement, linked to the "crucial terms
'authors' and 'writings' in Article I, Section 8.71 For its analysis of the
originality requirement and, by extension, of the fact/expression dichotomy,
the Feist Court turned to another seminal copyright case-Burrow-Giles
LithographicCo. v. Sarony, decided in 1884.72
The work at issue in Burrow-Giles was a photograph of Oscar Wilde,
which the defendant had reproduced and offered for sale in thousands of
copies. 7 The photograph shows Wilde seated in a contemplative pose, his
head propped against his left hand while his right hand clutches a book.74 He
is dressed in what appears to be a velvet coat and knee breeches, and plush
draperies cover his chair. 75 The defendant argued that a photograph is not
subject to copyright because it is not the "writing" of an "author," as the
Constitution requires, but a "reproduction on paper of the exact features of
some natural object or of some person." 76 The Court found the constitutional
question "not free from difficulty," 77 but ultimately held that photographs can

68.
One could argue that some ideas exist independent of the human mind. For example,
perhaps the "idea" of the Pythagorean theorem would still exist, in some sense, even if there were no
human mathematicians to appreciate it. These philosophical quandaries of the tree-falls-in-the-forest
variety can be short-circuited simply by categorizing as "fact," rather than "idea," any property of the
world that may be discovered, but is not created, by an author.
69.
But see infra Part IVA_
70.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
71.
Feist, 449 U.S. at 346.
72.
I11 U.S. 53 (1884).
73.
Id. at 54.

74. Napolean
Sarony,
"Oscar
Wilde,
No.
18"
http://www.humnet.ucla.edu/humnet/clarldib/wildphot/sarony.htm.
75. Id.
76. Burrow-Giles, II1 U.S. at 56.
77. Id.

(1882),

available

at
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be copyrightable works. 78 In part, the Court extrapolated from the treatment
previously given to maps and charts. While they are usually intended to
reflect the facts of the world rather than their author's fancy, maps and charts
were included in the subject matter of copyright in the act passed by the First
Congress. 79 More importantly, the Court found that photographers are
properly considered "authors." 80 An "author," said the Court, is "'he to whom
anything owes its orifin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of
science or literature."' 1 Similarly, a "writing" does not mean only words on
paper, but properly includes other means, such as printing and engraving, "by
which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression." 82 If
Congress (up to that time) had not explicitly included photography in the list
of works subject to copyright, it was probably only because photography had
not been invented when the statute was enacted. 3
The "difficulties" lay in the argument that a photograph, unlike a painting
or even a map, is not the product of an artist's skill, but a mechanical
reproduction of the scene laid before the camera's lens:
[I]t is said that an engraving, a painting, a print, does embody the
intellectual conception of its author, in which there is novelty,
invention, originality, and therefore comes within the purpose of the
Constitution in securing its exclusive use or sale to its author, while
the photograph is the mere mechanical reproduction of the physical
features or outlines of some object animate or inanimate, and
involves no originality of thought or any novelty in the intellectual
operation connected with its visible reproduction in shape of a
picture .... It is simply the manual operation, by the use of..
instruments and preparations, of transferring to the plate the visible
representation of some existing object,
the accuracy of this
84
representation being its highest merit.
In other words, Oscar Wilde at a particular time on a particular day had looked
just as depicted in the photograph. His image was recorded on paper by a
mechanical process, but the photographer was not the "author" of the scene.
78.
Id. at 58.
79. Id. at 56-57. Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992), is a recent
case affirming the copyrightability of maps. Although the cartographer "sought to depict the
information accurately," the depiction of reality within the limited confines of a map required creative
choices of presentation. Id. at 140. More dubiously, the court also relied on the cartographer's
reconciliation of conflicting sources. Id. To the extent that the reconciliations were meant to reveal
the true lay of the land, they could be characterized as unprotectable facts.
80.
Burrow-Giles, Il1 U.S. at 60.
81.
Id. at 57-58 (quoting WORCESTER'S ELEMENTARY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 48 (1860)).

82.
83.
84.

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 58-59.
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The Court disagreed.8 5 The photograph, it held, was an expression of the
photographer's "own original mental conception," given "visible form by
posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the
costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph,
arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and
disposing the light and shade, [and] suggesting and evoking the desired
expression."86 By stage-managing the scene the photographer had become the
"author" of the photograph; the act of authorship was not triggering the
shutter, but setting up the shot. 8The
7 resulting photograph was "the product of
plaintiffs intellectual invention."
Subsequent cases have also relied on photographers' exercise of creative
discretion in terms of arranging, selecting or framing a scene, as well as in
such technical matters as the choice of lenses, film and developing techniques,
to supply the necessary elements of "authorship" and "originality., 88 In an era
when photography is universally accepted as an art form, and the differences
between an Ansel Adams landscape and an amateur's snapshot are readily
apparent,8 9 the status of photographs as copyrightable works could pass
unquestioned. Still, the idea that authorship can be found in the manipulation
of the "facts" recorded in the work-such as the "fact" of how Oscar Wilde
posed in a chair at a particular moment-is a curious one. In a sense,
manipulating the scene to produce a photographic image is similar to
manipulating daubs of paint to produce a portrait on canvass. Both translate
the author's vision into a medium of communication. On the other hand, the
former changes the scene portrayed in the work of authorship, not just the

85. Id. at 60.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992). In Los
Angeles News, the court held that "raw" news footage of disaster scenes met the standard of
originality, based on testimony regarding:
[T]he initial decisions about the newsworthiness of the events and how best to
tell the stories succinctly and effectively; the selections of camera lenses, angles
and exposures; the choices of the heights and directions from which to tape and
what portions of the events to film and for how long.
Id. The camera operator compared herself to an artist: "'I use a paintbrush. I use the camera to tell a
story."' Id See also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Elements of originality in
a photograph may include posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking
the desired expression, and almost any other variant involved."). In Rogers, the photographer of a
group of puppies "drew on his years of artistic development" in choosing the lighting, the location,
and the arrangement of the dogs. Id. at 304. "He also made creative judgments concerning technical
matters with his camera and the use of natural light." Id.
89. The amateur's snapshot is no less copyrightable than the artist's photograph. Even the least
sophisticated photographer makes choices that influence the outcome, and courts are unwilling to base
decisions of copyrightability on their perceptions of artistic merit. See infra notes 103-106 and
accompanying text.
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representationof that scene in a medium of expression, somewhat
blurring the
90
line between author and subject, or medium and message.
In any event, the Burrow-Giles definition of "author" as "he to whom
anything owes its origin" has played a leading role in the development of the
fact/expression dichotomy. In Feist, the Court described this "originality"
requirement as "the touchstone of copyright protection" 91 and "'the very
premise of copyright law."' 92 As the Court explained:
"No one may claim originality as to facts." This is because facts do
not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one
between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a
particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely
discovered its existence. To borrow from Burrow-Giles, one who
discovers a fact is not its "maker" or "originator." "The discoverer
merely finds and records." Census takers, for example, do not
"create" the population figures that emerge from their efforts; in a
sense, they copy these figures from the world around them. Census
data therefore do not trigger copyright because these data are not
"original" in the constitutional sense. The same is true of all factsscientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day. "They may
not be copyrighted
and are part of the public domain available to
93
every person."
On its face, the distinction seems obvious and relatively easy to apply.
Authors are truly "authors" of the expression they use to communicate facts;
such expression has its "origin" in an author's thought processes. Authors do
not create the facts, and cannot claim that the facts they report are "original" in
that sense.94 If I report the population of Princeton New Jersey as 12,331-a
figure I may have discovered but did not create-others may reproduce that
95
fact. They may not reproduce my individual manner of expressing that fact,
which does "owe its origin" to me.96 As the Feist Court went on to explain,

90. Natkin v. Winfrey, Ill F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (rejecting claim by the
producers of The Oprah Winfrey Show that they were co-authors of photographs depicting Winfrey on
the set, holding that the elements the producers contributed--such as Winfrey, her facial expressions,
her attire and the staging of the show-are not copyrightable).
91.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
92. Id. (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981)).
93. Id. at 347-48 (citations omitted).
94. On occasion, of murse, an author may invent "facts." See infra notes 107-116 and
accompanying text.
95. Unless there are so few ways to express the fact that the doctrine of "merger" applies, as it
would in the idea/expression context. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
96. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547-48 (1985)
("[C]opyright does not prevent subsequent users from copying from a prior author's work those
constituent elements that are not original-for example. . . facts, or materials in the public domainas long as such use does not unfairly appropriate the author's original contributions.").
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compilations of facts raise more difficult issues. 97 Even though each fact in a
compilation, considered individually, is uncopyrightable, the collection of
facts may be copyrightable. This is so because the "selection, coordination,
and arrangement" of the facts may98introduce an element of expression which
does "owe its origin" to the author.
Although originality is essential to the copyrightability of a work of
authorship, the amount of originality required is very modest. In the words of
one court, "only a dash of it will do." 99 Originality does not require any
measure of talent. The humblest doodle is as "original," in the sense of
"owing its origin" to its creator, as the most sophisticated work of art.1 00 Nor
does "originality" require novelty. Unlike a patent, which can be denied or
held invalid if the claimed invention already existed in the "prior art,"101 a
valid copyright can subsist in a work that is indistinguishable from other works
that preceded it, so long as it was not copied from its predecessors. 102
The Supreme Court set the low threshold of originality in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co.,103 where the parties (and members of the
Court) debated the copyrightability of a set of circus posters. Justice Harlan,
in dissent, argued that a mere advertisement with scant artistic qualities should
have no copyright protection. 1'4 The majority held otherwise, largely based on
the unsuitability of courts to judge aesthetic merit.1 05 The Court observed that
97. Feist, 499 U.S. at 357-58.
98. Id. at 357.
99. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992). See also Feist, 499 U.S. at 358
(referring to the "minimal level" of creativity required by the "not particularly stringent" requirement
of originality).
100. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Term
papers by college sophomores are as much within the domain of copyright as Saul Bellow's latest
novel.").
101. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
102. The usual hypothetical involves a poet whose verse happens to be identical to Keats's "Ode
on a Grecian Urn," even though not copied from the earlier poem. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). In theory, the second poet could claim a copyright for
his poem. Id
Borrowed the work must indeed not be, for a plagiarist is not himself pro tanto
an "author"; but if by some magic a man who had never known it were to
compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an "author," and, if
he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course
copy Keats's.
Id. Of course, the poet would have a difficult time persuading anyone of the poem's originality, and
potential infringers would argue that they had copied from Keats, not from his successor.
103. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
104. "The clause of the Constitution giving Congress power to promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited terms to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective works and discoveries, does not, as I think, embrace a mere advertisement of a circus." Id.
at 253 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 251-52.
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside
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even the least of artistic creations, and those that most faithfully depict "actual
...

visible things," reflect something of the author's personality:
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature.
Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has
in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That
106
something he may copyright ....

C. The Process/Expression Dichotomy
The last of the dichotomies is what I will call the "process/expression

dichotomy," which distinguishes between a process (e.g., a method of
preparing a cr~me brul ) and a work of authorship describing that process
(e.g., a cookbook recipe for cr~me brul6).
Generally speaking, the
process/expression dichotomy separates useful procedures that are, at best,

patentable from writings that are potentially copyrightable.
be traced to the seminal case of Baker v. Selden. 10 7

The doctrine can
Selden devised an

of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke.. . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which
appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the
interest of any public, they have a commercial value-it would be bold to say
that they have not an aesthetic and educational value-and the taste of any
public is not to be treated with contempt.
Id.
106. Id. at 250. Subsequent cases set the threshold of originality so low that it might be satisfied
in spite of the author's best efforts to be unoriginal. For example, in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), the court determined that carefully reproduced mezzotints of
old masters were sufficiently "original" to be copyrighted:
All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the
"author" contributed something more than a "merely trivial" variation,
something 'tecognizeably his own." Originality in this context "means little
more than a prohibition of actual copying." No matter how poor artistically the
"author's" addition, it is enough if it be his own.
Id. at 102-03 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)). The
court found that the mezzotints had "'originated' with those who made them," and it credited
evidence that the reproductions did not, and were not intended to, precisely imitate the original
paintings. Id at 104-05. Moreover, the court found that even inadvertent deviations from the
original could satisfy the requirement of originality: "A copyist's bad eyesight or defective
musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable
variations." Id. at 105. In other words, an "original" variation may have its origin not in the mind,
personality or will of the author, but in his tremulous hand. But cf Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (suggesting that a copyright plaintiff must demonstrate "'the
existence of . . . intellectual production, of thought, and conception."' (quoting Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53, 56-60 (1984))).
107. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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improved double-entry system of bookkeeping, which he explained in a book
containing examples of the required forms. 108 Baker made and used account
books based on essentially the same system, leading to charges of copyright
infringement. 109 A book explaining an accounting method may be
copyrighted," 10 but the Court noted the "clear distinction between the book, as
such, and the art which it is intended to illustrate.""'
The same distinction may be predicated of every other art as well as
that of book-keeping. A treatise on the composition and use of
medicines, be they old or new; on the construction and use of
ploughs, or watches, or chums; or on the mixture and application of
colors for painting or dyeing; or on the mode of drawing lines to
produce the effect of perspective,-would be the subject of
copyright; but no one would contend that the copyright of the
treatise would give the exclusive right to the art or manufacture
To give to the author of the book an exclusive
described therein ....
property in the art described therein, when no examination of its
novelty has ever been 2officially made, would be a surprise and a
fraud upon the public. 1
The inventor of a useful process must seek exclusive rights to that process
through the patent system," 13 and if the inventor publishes a book explaining
the process, without obtaining a patent, the process itself is "given to the
public.""114 Moreover, if the process cannot be used without the reproduction
of written materials (as was the case with Selden's forms), then the materials
"are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to
the public ...for the purpose of practical application." "15
The Court found the distinction between the explanation of a process and
the process itself "so evident, that it requires hardly any argument to support
it." 116 Although the distinction is less evident today, when computer programs
are included within the subject matter of copyright, '17the principle of Baker is
still important. 18 As the Court observed, "[t]he very object of publishing a
108. Id. at 1O0.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 101-02 ("There is no doubt that a work on the subject of book-keeping, though only
explanatory of well-known systems, may be the subject of a copyright...
111. Id. at 102.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 103.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 102.
117. A computer program is both a detailed description of a process and a necessary means for
carrying it out. Durham, supra note 20, at 1457-66.
118. The principle of Baker is now embodied in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which provides
that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
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book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful
knowledge which it contains," and that object "would be frustrated if the
knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the
book.'' 19 Since an author's motivation might be making money for himself
rather than communicating knowledge to the public, it would be more accurate
to say that the object of the copyright laws is to benefit the public by the
dissemination of knowledge. If publishing a description of a process allowed
the author to monopolize that process, the public would benefit little from the
publication. Should a monopoly be warranted as a means of encouraging
invention, then it should be obtained through the patent system, which
provides for rigorous examination, a shorter term than copyright, and strict
standards of novelty and non-obviousness.
An issue not discussed in Baker is originality. Both Selden's system and
his description of it seem to fall within the broad Burrow-Giles definition of
originality, since both "had their origin" in Selden's mind. He did not "copy"
his system from the world around him, as a census taker might be said to
"copy" population statistics. 120 Nevertheless, the Court's recognition of
separate realms of creativity with separate systems of reward-patents for
innovations in the useful arts, copyrights for original means of expressionbears on the question of originality in factual works, particularly when the
works purport to be "useful" in ways generally associated with patentable
inventions. 121

III. FACTS, LIES AND

SPECULATION

The Feist case marked an attempt to reconcile two opposing principles of
copyright law, each with "an impeccable pedigree":' 22 "The first is that facts
124
are not copyrightable; 23 the other, that compilations of facts generally are."'
As long as the compilation is nothing more than a compendium of data, as
could be said of the telephone book at issue in Feist, 25 the two propositions
may seem incompatible. As the Court said, "[c]ommon sense tells us that 100
uncopyrightable facts do not magically change their status when gathered
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1994).
119. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
120. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991); Denicola, supra
note 5, at 525.
121. See infranote 372.
122. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344.
123. See supra Part II.B.
124. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344.
125. Narrative works, such as histories or biographies, can be described as "compilations of
facts," but they are usually so rich in language that it is easier to distinguish between the facts
themselves and the expression used to communicate them.
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together in one place."'126 Yet properties can be found in a collection that are
absent in its individual components. A symphony is more than the notes of the
scale; the character of the symphony depends on how those notes are
combined. Similarly, the qualities of a novel depend on how the author puts
together words that might be found in any dictionary. When notes or words
are assembled in works of authorship, the whole means much more, and has
far greater claims to originality, than any of its component parts. In the same
way, a collection of facts may include dimensions of authorship entirely
lacking in any isolated fact.
That circumstance is reflected in the Copyright Act, which denies
protection to facts, 127 but includes within the subject matter of copyright
"compilations" 128 wherein "preexisting materials or... data ...are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship."'129 Facts are not born in the mind
of an author and are not "original" in that sense, but the selection of facts for a
particular compilation, and the manner in which those facts are organized and
presented, may be as creative as any other product of an author's taste,
judgment or imagination. According to Feist, it is here one finds the
"originality" necessary for a factual compilation to be copyrighted as a work
30
of authorship. 1
Because copyright extends only to those "original" aspects of a compilation
and not to the facts themselves, the protection afforded to a factual
compilation is inevitably "thin.' 3' A subsequent author may borrow freely
from a factual compilation, so long as there is no copying of the first author's
original "selection, coordination or arrangement."'' 32 That result might seem
"unfair" because "much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be used

126. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see also Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investor Servs., Inc., 751 F.2d
501, 505 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Thus the law of copyrights defies the laws of logic .... ").
127. The reference in § 102(b) to "discoveries" implicitly disallows copyrighting facts. See
supra note 66.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
130. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to
place them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used
effectively by readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as
they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of
creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compilations
through the copyright laws.

Id.
131. Id. at 349.
132. Id. On the other hand, infringement requires only that the selection, coordination and
arrangement be substantially similar; they need not be identical. Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown
Today Publ'g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991) ('[although copyright in compilations is]
'thin,' we do not believe it is anorexic").
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without compensation," but it is, according to Feist, the very "'essence of
copyright," 3 3 and what the Constitution itself requires:
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of
authors, but "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by a work. This principle, known as the
idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all works of
authorship. As applied to a factual compilation, assuming the
absence of original written expression, only the compiler's selection
and arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied at
will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the134means by
which copyright advances the progress of science and art.
In the remainder of Part III, I review how courts have dealt with factual or
pseudo-factual compilations 135 of various kinds. Some of these compilations,
like the directories discussed in Part III.A, present rather unambiguous facts in
rather obvious ways. Others, such as the works of conjecture and prediction
discussed in Parts III.C-E, are based on the authors' more speculative notions
of reality. In their various ways, these works present a common problem:
when a work conveys, or purports to convey, information about the world
beyond the inner workings of the author's imagination, what aspects of the
work are properly subject to copyright, and what aspects, through the
operation of the dichotomies already discussed, are properly given over to the
public domain?

A. Directories
Although the Feist Court resolved to its satisfaction the abstract dilemma of
copyrightable compilations of uncopyrightable facts, 36 it still had to determine
133. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 589 (1985)).
134. Id. at 349-50 (citations omitted). Relying solely on the incentive theory of copyright, the
Court rejected any award of rights to fact compilers to compensate for their labors, or "sweat of the
brow." Id at 354 ("Without a doubt, the 'sweat of the brow' doctrine flouted basic copyright
principles.").
135. I use "compilation" here in a general sense, to mean any work or authorship in which facts
are assembled. In some cases, such as telephone directories, any original authorship would have to
reside in the selection, coordination and arrangement of facts, since the form allows few opportunities
for the creative use of language. In works such as histories and biographies, language is a much
larger part of the author's creative contribution.
136. Feist, 499 U.S. at 350-51.
This, then, resolves the doctrinal tension: Copyright treats facts and factual
compilations in a wholly consistent manner. Facts, whether alone or as part of a
compilation, are not original and therefore may not be copyrighted. A factual
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whether a white pages telephone directory met the standard of a copyrightable
compilation. Section 101 does not say that all factual compilations are entitled
to copyright, but only those wherein the facts are "selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship."' 137 This suggests that the facts included in some
compilations may be "selected, coordinated, or arranged" in a manner that
does not produce an "original work of authorship."
To require a high degree of artistry in the selection or arrangement of facts
would be inconsistent with the low threshold of originality established in
Bleistein and other cases. 138 Feist reaffirms that the requirements of originality
are, infact, minimal:
[Tihe originality requirement is not particularly stringent. A
compiler may settle upon a selection or arrangement that others have
used; novelty is not required. Originality requires only that the
author make the selection or arrangement independently (i.e.,
without copying that selection or arrangement from
another work),
139
and that it display some minimal level of creativity.
While "the vast majority of compilations will pass this test," there is still "a
narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so
trivial as to be virtually nonexistent."140 In a copyrightable compilation, "the
selection and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to
require no creativity whatsoever."' 14' The Court found the selection and
organization of materials in the alphabetically-ordered white pages directory
so routine as to be utterly lacking in creativity,
thereby disqualifying the
42
directory as a copyrightable work of authorship. 1
A number of other directories have been tested under the Feist standard of
originality.
In Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing
Enterprises,Inc. ,' the Second Circuit considered whether a "Chinese yellow
pages" telephone directory met the standard of originality. Whereas the Feist
white pages directory had merely listed telephone subscribers in alphabetical
order, the Key directory, like other yellow pages directories, listed businesses

compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an original selection or

arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular selection or
arrangement. In no event may copyright extend to the facts themselves.
Id.
137.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).

138. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
139. Feist, 499 U.S. at 358.
140. Id. at 359.
141.

Id.at 362.

142. Id.
143. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
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by category.144 In this case, the businesses and categories had been chosen
with regard to the needs and interests of the Chinese community. 145 The
directory, for example, included listings under the category of "Bean Curd and
Bean Sprout Shops."' 146 Although the court found no infringement, it did find
the directory sufficiently original to be copyrighted. 47 In contrast to the
directory in Feist, where every telephone subscriber in the area had been
included, the Chinese directory included only those businesses that the
compiler, in the exercise of her judgment, considered most appropriate for her
audience:
In assembling the directory, Ms. Wang had to select from a
multitude of businesses in New York and elsewhere those of greatest
interest to her audience-the New York City Chinese-American
community .. . . Ms. Wang testified that she excluded from the
directory those businesses she did not think would remain open for
very long, such as certain insurance brokers,148take-out restaurants,
and traditional Chinese medical practitioners.
The choice of categories to include and how they should be named also
required the exercise of creativity. 149 These acts of selection and judgment
were found sufficient to render the compilation "original."' 50
In BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information
Publishing,'5 ' the Eleventh Circuit considered a more conventional yellow
pages and found its "selection, coordination and arrangement" lacking in
originality. Although businesses were organized by category, the court held
those categories to be "entirely typical" of yellow pages directories, 152 or, in
the characterization of Feist, "'not only unoriginal, [but] practically
inevitable."" 53 The choice of which businesses to list under which categories
144. Id. at 512.
145. Id.at 514.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 512-14.
148. Id. at 513.
149. Id.at 514.
150. Id. Similar circumstances led to a similar result in J.R. O'Dwyer Co. v. Editorial Media
Marketing International, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). JR. O'Dwyer concerned a
directory of public relations firms. Id. at 601. The selection of firms to include in the directory had not
been "routine" or "mechanical," but had depended on the subjective judgment of Mr. O'Dwyer. See
id. He included any firm that subscribed to his newsletter, any firm that paid for the privilege, and
some firms that declined to pay but which he considered "too important to omit." Id. He also
endeavored to include only firms that he considered "true PR firms." Id at 605. The selection of
firms, he claimed, lay "at the heart of his creative effort." Id. The court agreed, holding that
O'Dwyer's "inclusion of certain publicity-averse firms and his solicitation of listings from many other
firms does constitute sufficient authorship to render his listings a copyrightable compilation." Id.
151. 999 F.2d 1436 (Ilth Cir. 1993) (en banc).
152. Id. at 1442.
153. Id. (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991)).
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had been based, in significant part, on the preferences of customers and their
54
willingness to pay, and so could not be considered an "original" selection. 1
The plaintiff had employed distinctive and creative marketing techniques,
which ultimately influenced the contents of the directory,'15 but the court
characterized these marketing techniques as "not acts of authorship, but
techniques for the discovery of facts."' 56 To find "originality" in such
techniques, however innovative, would contradict the Feist distinction
between "creation" and "discovery." '57
By employing its sales strategies, [plaintiff] discovered that certain
subscribers describe their businesses in a particular fashion and were
willing to pay for a certain number of listings under certain available
business descriptions. To be sure, [plaintiff] employed a set of
strategies or techniques for discovering this data. Any useful
collection of facts, however, will be structured by a number of
decisions regarding the optimal manner in which to collect the
pertinent data in the most efficient and accurate manner. If this were
sufficient, then the protection of copyright would extend to census
data, cited in Feist as a paradigmatic example of a work that lacks
the requisite originality. Just as the Copyright Act does not protect
"industrious collection," it affords no shelter to the resourceful,
efficient, or creative collector. The protection of copyright must
inhere in a creatively original selection of facts to be58 reported and
not in the creative means used to discover those facts.1
In other words, it is not enough for the author of a factual compilation to be
clever; rather, the author must be clever (or, at least, minimally creative) in the
presentation of the facts, if the compilation is to be considered "original."
One of the most difficult of the directory cases is Warren Publications,Inc.
v. Microdos Data Corp.,5 9 also from the Eleventh Circuit. The work at issue

154. Id. at 1444. "While [plaintiff] may select the headings that are offered to the subscriber, it
is the subscriberwho selects from those alternatives the headings under which the subscriber will
appear in the copyrighted directory. The headings that actually appear in the directory thus, do not
owe their origin to [plaintiff] .
d.
155. These included:
the determination of the number of free listings offered to each subscriber, the
selection of which customers to contact by an on-premise visit from sales
personnel, the selection of the date of commencement of its advertisement sales
campaign, and the procedure used to recommend the purchase of listings under
multiple headings.
Id. at 1441.
156. id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (citations omitted).
159. 115 F.3d 1509 (11 th Cir. 1997).

33:0791]

SPEAKING OF THE WORLD

was a directory of cable television systems,' 60 4t system" defined by Warren as
"an entity offering subscribers in one or more communities the same cable
services for the same price." 161The directory included a section for each state,
and within each section a listing of communities in that state, arranged
alphabetically.162 Because many of the systems served multiple communities,
and listing the same information under the heading of each community would
have been duplicative, Warren listed the pertinent information for each system
only under the heading of the "principal" community, with cross-references
under the heading of the other communities. 163 The "principal" communities
were selected by the operators of each cable system.164 The district court
granted partial summary judgment, holding Warren's organization sufficiently
"original" to merit copyright protection under Feist. 65 The Eleventh Circuit
reversed.
As to the "selection" of the information presented, the court found that
Warren had included all of the communities of which it was aware. '66 In that
respect, the directory was closer to the all-inclusive listing held unoriginal in
Feist than the more selective listing in Key. 167 The selection of the "principal
communities" was also unavailing, since that selection had been made by the
cable system operators, rather than Warren. 168 Consequently, Warren's best
claim of "originality" lay in its general plan of organizing information by
principal communities, rather than in some other fashion. The court dismissed
that argument as well, holding that if Warren's plan of organizing data was a
"system," as the district court had termed it, then permitting Warren exclusive
169
rights to that "system" would contradict § 102(b) of the Copyright Act.
Even if Warren's plan was not a "system" within the meaning of the statute, its
usefulness denied it the status of an "original" creation. The court described
Warren's decision to use "principal communities" as a decision "to make the
[directory] commercially useful,"170 and held that "[t]he mere discovery of an
organizing principle which is dictated by the market is not sufficient to
160. Id. at 1512. The directory contained "extensive information on cable systems, including,
inter alia, the name, address, and telephone number of the cable system operator, the number of
subscribers, the channels offered, the price of service, and the types of equipment used." Id.
161. Id. at 1517.
162. Id. at 1512.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1517, 1519.
165. Id. at 1511.
166. Id. at 1518 ("[Warren] did not exercise any creativity or judgment in 'selecting' cable
systems to include in its Factbook, but rather included the entire relevant universe known to it.").
167. Id. at 1518-19.
168. Id. at 1519 (drawing a parallel to the similar circumstances in BellSouth Advertising &
Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, 999 F.2d 1436 (1993)).
169. Id. at 1517. Section 102(b) prohibits the extension of copyright to "any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
170.

Id. at 1518.
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establish creativity."' 7'
In terms of the line drawn in Feist, a system of
organization72that serves the needs of the market is a "discovery" rather than a
"creation."1
The majority's decision prompted a strong dissent by three judges, who
argued that Warren had made a series of choices regarding the presentation of
the cable system information, which in aggregate were sufficiently creative to
meet the low threshold of originality:
The acts of selection carried out by Warren were a stream of events,
beginning with its choice of the facts it wanted and the construct of a
functional methodology in which to develop and present them. The
use of a geographic name for each cable system, and the choice of
the names of principal communities as identifiers, and the decision
on a particular name, were not isolated acts of selection like Athena
springing full grown from the brow of Zeus, or a decision made by a
snap of someone's fingers, or a mechanical decision from a single
telephone call, or by numerous calls. They were parts of the stream
of acts of selection ....This court does not, however, refer to
Warren's exercise of judgment in creating this structure of selection
and in choosing the facts to be reported and how to report them. Yet
these acts of selection are independent expressions of the author,
part of the overall "work of authorship." This court does not hold
them to be unoriginal or non-creative. Instead, it ignores them and
treats this case as turning on the single fact of the source of
information about principal communities. This trivializes what this
case is about. 73

Warren is a difficult case because it raises questions under each of the
"dichotomies" discussed in Part II.
Organizing information by principal
communities undoubtedly serves a useful function, at least in reducing the
bulk of the directory, so one might conclude, under Baker, that such a practical
system should be beyond the scope of copyright. 174 On the other hand, the
author of the directory in Key based her selections on what she considered
most "useful" to her audience, 175 as would the authors of most factual
compilations.
To deny copyright to any "selection, coordination or
arrangement" of facts which is useful would deny copyright to most factual
compilations, contrary to the clear intentions of Feist,' 6 or would, at the very
least, provide the authors of such works with perverse incentives. Application
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1520 n.31.
See id.
Id. at 1527-28 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
See supraPart II.C.

175.

See supra notes 143-148 and accompanying text.

176. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) (describing as a
"well-established proposition" the principle that "compilations of facts generally are
[copyrightable]").
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of the fact/expression dichotomy 177 is equally problematic. The identity of the
principal community in each system might be considered a "fact," even if
based on the opinion of the system operators. 178 It is more difficult to
characterize Warren's organizational scheme itself as a "fact." The majority
appears to treat it as a fact, because it best suits the needs of the market, and is
therefore, in some sense, "discoverable."
But one can argue that
organizational schemes are always imposed on the world, rather than
discovered in it, so they are "creations" more than they are "discoveries."
These issues arise more explicitly in the case of taxonomies, discussed in Part
III.B.
Perhaps the best way to analyze the facts of Warren is under the rubric of
the idea/expression dichotomy. 179
The dissent characterizes Warren's
directory as the product of a series of choices, beginning with the "choice of
facts it wanted."' I80 One could say that Warren's first choice was to produce a
directory of cable systems, rather than a directory of Italian restaurants or
internet websites. However, many of Warren's more general choices must
have been choices of ideas to pursue, rather than choices of how to express
those ideas. As already discussed, the line between idea and expression is a
difficult one to draw, and depends primarily on the court's intuitive
understanding of the most fruitful competitive balance.' 8 ' Given what are
likely to be a limited number of reasonable ways in which to organize a cable
system directory, 182 it would be reasonable to treat Warren's organizing
principle as an unprotectable idea, thereby circumventing the more difficult to
apply fact/expression and process/expression dichotomies.

B. Taxonomies
The issues hinted at in Warren were more squarely presented in American
Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 8 3 which concerned the
copyrightability of "taxonomies." A "taxonomy" is a system of grouping and
describing differing objects or phenomena.' 8 4 A taxonomy of baseball cards
might group them by manufacturer, then by year, by team, by player position
177. See supra Part II.B.
178. See infra Part IV.A.
179. See supra Part II.A.

180. Warren Publ'ns, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1527 (1lth Cir. 1997)
(Godbold, J., dissenting).
18 1. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing "merger").
183. 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
184. Id. at 980. Or, in the definition provided by Webster's Third International Dictionary-"the
systematic distinguishing, ordering, and naming of type groups within a subject field." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2345 (1993).
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and
so
on,
so
that
any
card could
be
classified-e.g.,
Topps/1989/Yankees/Outfielders. In American Dental, the taxonomy took the
form of a uniform "Code on Dental Procedures and Nomenclature," devised
for convenience in billing and insurance processing. 81 5 The Code grouped
procedures by type and included a number and brief description for eache.g., "04267 'guided tissue regeneration-nonresorbable barrier, per site, per
tooth (includes membrane removal). ' 186
The defendant, Delta Dental,
claimed the right to reprint modified versions of the code, without the
permission of the Code's author, the American Dental Association. 187
The district court considered the element of "creativity" required of an
original work of authorship, 8 8 and found that it involved a measure of
"imagination."' 8 9 "Imagination" is defined as "'the power which the mind has
of forming concepts beyond those derived from external objects." ' 19° The
concept of a horse, said the court, is not imaginative because horses exist in
the world and are observable through the senses. 19 1 Even the concept of a
unicorn is not particularly imaginative, since examples "exist in literature and
art.I92 A horse with three horns would be truly imaginative, because until the
court "made it up just now," such an animal "probably . . . existed in neither
nature nor art.' 93 To limit "imagination," and hence "creativity," to "[o]nly
the fantastic, the yet unimagined" would, however, "have the practical effect
194
of excluding the great bulk of materials submitted for copyright protection."'
Hence the court proposed a novel (one could even say "imaginative") analysis
for testing the originality of less fanciful works:
Perhaps it is better to think about creativity (and therefore
imagination) as that element which remains when form is separated
from function. In other words, isolating the merely useful (i.e., those
things which are solely about function) from those things which are
useful plus something else (i.e., those things which can be
appreciated for some quality aside from their utility). This paradigm

185. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 977.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 977-78.

188. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n., No. 92-C5909, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5809, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 1996).
189. "Imagination is the standard touchstone of creativity." Id.
190. Id. at *23 (quoting 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 669). An alternative definition of
"imagination" would limit it to "'the creative faculty of the mind in its highest aspect; the power of
framing new and striking intellectual conceptions; poetic genius."' Id. (quoting 7 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 669). The court acknowledged that "[ilfcopyrightability were dependent on qualities of
poetic genius, the body of material suitable for copyright would be slim indeed." Id.
191. Id. at *24.
192. Id.
193. Id..
194. Id.
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essentially boils down to a distinction between means and ends. Is
the material merely a means to some end, or is it an end in itself?
Consider a lamp. A lamp's primary function is to provide light;
thus it may be said to be the means (bulb, switch, electricity) to a
particular end (illumination). But a lamp may also be an end in
itself-an object that can stand on its own after its utility is factored
out-as may be seen in the multicolored leaded-glass mosaic lamps
designed by Louis Comfort Tiffany, which provide a degree of
aesthetic pleasure aside from their illuminative capacities. A
Tiffany lamp exemplifies' what I mean when I say "useful plus."
Remove the "useful," and some "plus" remains. That remaining
"plus" is the creative, imaginative component deserving of copyright
protection. If, on the other hand, nothing remains after the "useful"
is taken away-if the primary function is removed from the formthe work is devoid of even that modicum of creativity required for
195
protection, and hence is uncopyrightable.
The court called its approach a "means/ends analysis."' 196 It borrows, to
some extent, from the analysis applied to "useful articles,"' 97 which are
copyrightable if, but only if, the "design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article."' '
In the
version the court proposed for literary works, one would ask whether the work
merely served a function, or whether it could be appreciated on its own
account. An entirely functional work would fail the test of creativity.
Moreover, "if the primary purpose of a factual compilation is not to entertain,
express, incite, inform, educate, etc., but these effects occur anyway, they may
be considered simply noncreative byproducts of the work's main purpose of
accomplishing a specific task." 199

195. Id. at *25.
196. Id. at *26.
197. "A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V
1999).

198.

Id. Since 'separability" may be conceptual rather than physical, the copyright analysis of

useful articles can be particularly vexing. See Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834
F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); Barry Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.
1980).
199. Am. Dental, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5809, at *28 (emphasis added).
The court

characterized its means/ends analysis as a "refined shortcut" of the analysis suggested in Feist. Id. at
*30. Yet the court's denial of copyright to works having a utilitarian "primary purpose" seems
contrary to the supposition of Feist that the vast majority of factual compilations are copyrightable, as
well as the long tradition of copyrighting maps and charts, the "primary purpose" of which is seldom
aesthetic. In addition to its means/ends analysis, the court also applied what it deemed a conventional
Feist analysis of selection, coordination and arrangement and still found the Code lacking in
originality. Id. at *29-30.

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

The court offered a standard eye chart as an example of a work lacking in
originality, applying the court's means/ends distinction: "Remove the function,
and the creative component of the form is negligible; there is no imaginative
'plus' that reasonably warrants copyright protection. '' 200
Turning its
means/ends analysis to the code of dental procedures, the court found no
creativity: "The primary purpose behind the Code is administrative
convenience: making billing easier for dentists, their clients, and insurance
companies . . . . The Code is intended solely as the means to an end
(administrative efficiency), not an end in and of itself."'2 ' The kind of
aesthetic "plus" that makes a Tiffany lamp more than a light source is not to be
found in the Code.2ea
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's analysis.20 3 As
urged by the American Medical Association, the American National Standards
Institute, the Underwriter Laboratories and similar groups,204 the court held
20 5
are creative efforts worthy of copyright. 206
that taxonomies, useful or not,
200.

Id. at *29.
It would be facetious to argue that the primary purpose of such a chart is to
entertain or to provoke rigorous debate or to communicate useful information.
The raison d'etre for an eye chart is one of mere utility: testing vision. It is the
means to an end, not an end in itself.

Id.
Id. at*32.
Id.
Yes, theoretically you could frame a copy of the Code and place it on the wall
for decorative purposes; or read it to your children at bedtime to entertain them.
But to argue such uses as the Code's primary purpose is risible: the entire history
of the Code shows it was meant to be utilized, not enjoyed on any aesthetic or
educative level.
Id. The district court also disparaged the notion of creativity in a work prepared by committee:
Creativity is, by and large, the province of the individual ... . [Wjhere does that
leave those works which are the result of collaboration? Is "creation by
committee" an oxymoron? If too many cooks are deemed to spoil the broth, the
reason might be that in art, if not in life, more is less; the more participants that
contribute, the less individual-and therefore the less personal-the result.
Collectivism, by its very nature, necessitates dilution of the individual creative
impulse.
Id. at *46.
203. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 978-79 (7th Cir. 1997).
204. Id. at 978.
205. The court observed that many useful works, such as blueprints, instruction manuals,
encyclopedias and maps, would "flunk the district court's test of originality." Id. "Yet these items
are routinely copyrighted, and challenges to the validity of these copyrights are routinely rejected."
id. Significantly,
Very little computer software could receive a copyright if the district judge is
correct: no one reads, for pleasure, the source or object code of the word
processing program on which this opinion was written, or of the operating
system that runs the computer: take away the "useful" elements and these
endeavors are worthless.
201.
202.
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Just as a scientist may copyright a description of the world (though not the
facts per se), "[s]o too with a taxonomy--of butterflies, legal citations, or
dental procedures. 2 °7
Classification is a creative endeavor. Butterflies may be grouped by
their color, or the shape of their wings, or their feeding or breeding
habits, or their habitats, or the attributes of their caterpillars, or the
sequence of their DNA; each scheme of classification could be
expressed in multiple ways. Dental procedures could be classified by
complexity, or by the tools necessary to perform them, or by the
parts of the mouth involved, or by the anesthesia employed, or in
any of a dozen different ways. The Code's descriptions don't
"merge with the facts" any more than a scientific description of
butterfly attributes is part of a butterfly. There can be multiple, and
equally original, biographies of the same person's
life, and multiple
20 8
original taxonomies of a field of knowledge.
A taxonomy is a "creation," not a "discovery;" to paraphrase Rorty: The
world is not organized. Only we are. 209 To some extent a taxonomy must
conform 21to reality, or it would poorly serve its admittedly utilitarian
purpose. 0 However, reality still leaves taxonomers with ample freedom to

organize and describe the world in individual and creative ways. With respect
to the Code:
Number 04267 reads "guided tissue regeneration-nonresorbable
barrier, per site, per tooth" but could have read "regeneration of
tissue, guided by nonresorbable barrier, one site and tooth per
entry". Or "use of barrier to guide regeneration of tissue, without
regard to the number of sites per tooth and whether or not the barrier
is resorbable". The first variation is linguistic, the second
substantive; in each case the decision to use the actual description is
original to the ADA, not knuckling under to an order imposed on
language by some "fact" about dental procedures. Blood is shed
in
I
preferable.
is
description
which
about
committees
the ADA's
A taxonomy, in the Seventh Circuit's view, is not a "compilation of bits and
pieces of 'reality,"' but a description of reality.2 12 Like other descriptions of
reality (histories, biographies, maps or scientific treatises), taxonomies are
206.
207.

Id. at 979-80.
Id. at 979.

208. Id. (citation omitted).
209. See RORTY, supra note I and accompanying text.
210. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 978 ("No one would read the ADA's Code for pleasure; it was
designed and is used for business (for records of patients' dental history or making insurance claims)
rather than aesthetic purposes.").
211. Id.at 979.
212. Id.at980.
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original and copyrightable, at least as long as other descriptions of reality
serve equally well. 213
C. Conjecture
The fact/expression dichotomy is easiest to apply when the fact is
reasonably objective-such as the population of Princeton, New Jersey in
1970. A fact of that nature depends to some extent on the person who reports
it, since one census taker may be more accurate than another, or may define
"population," "Princeton" or "1970" in a different manner. 2 14 However, there
are still truths about the population of Princeton, New Jersey which may owe
their discovery, but do not "owe their origin," to the census taker. Those
truths are not subject to copyright, though an author's manner of expressing
them may be. 23 5
The harder cases are those in which the "fact" is really a theory. Even if
the theory is presented as truth, it may be based as much on the author's
imagination as it is on independently verifiable data. One could more
plausibly argue that a theory "owes its origin" to the author, but at least with
respect to historical accounts, courts have treated conjecture in the same
manner as "hard facts." In Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,216 the
plaintiff devised a theory that the Hindenburg dirigible had been sabotaged by
a crewman named Eric Spehl.21 7 That theory, which was the product of
extensive research 218 but also some speculation, served as the framework for
21 9
the plaintiff's written account, entitled "Who Destroyed the Hindenburg?"
Ten years later, a second author produced a more literary retelling of the same
213.

In National Council of Compensation Insurance, Inc. v. Insurance Data Resources, Inc.,

No. 96-8036-Civ-Ryskamp, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17343 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 1996), a Florida district
court held uncopyrightable a similar taxonomy of "job codes" related to workers' compensation
claims. The court described the taxonomy as "a straightforward alphabetical listing of classifications
of workers, a descriptive and non-creative identification of the type of workers to be included in each
class, and a numerical code assigned to each class." Id. at *ll. The court did not find the creativity
or originality required to make the taxonomy a copyrightable work of authorship. Id.at * 13. See also
Duffy v. Penguin Books USA Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a fashion
writer's scheme of categorizing women's bodies into four types is uncopyrightable).
214.
215.
216.

See infra notes 337-338 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 94-96 and accompanying text.
618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).

217.

Id. at 975.

218.

Id. "Mr. Hoehling studied the investigative reports, consulted previously published articles

and books, and conducted interviews with survivors of the crash as well as others who possessed
information about the Hindenburg." Id. Hoehling's theory was "based entirely on the interpretation
of historical facts, including Spehl's life, his girlfriend's anti-Nazi connections, the explosion's origin
in Gas Cell 4, Spehl's duty station, discovery of a dry-cell battery among the wreckage, and rumors
about Spehl's involvement dating from a 1938 Gestapo investigation." Id. at 978-79.
219.

!d. at 975.
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events, employing the same theory as to the
saboteur. 220 Universal Studios
22
1
adapted the latter book for a motion picture.
Although the sabotage theory was novel, the court denied it any copyright
protection:
[Tihe protection afforded the copyright holder has never extended to
history, be it documented fact or explanatory hypothesis. The
rationale for this doctrine is that the cause of knowledge is best
served when history is the common property of all, and each
generation remains free to draw upon the discoveries and insights of
the past. Accordingly, the scope of copyright in historical accounts
is narrow indeed, embracing no more than the author's original
expression
of particular facts and theories already in the public
22 2
domain.
The court feared the "chilling effect" that would ensue if authors of histories
were not given "broad latitude" to make use of theories and interpretations
advanced by their predecessors. 223
In a similar case, the Seventh Circuit denied an author exclusive rights to
his theory that gangster John Dillinger survived long after his supposed
demise. 224 That theory, first advanced in books published by the plaintiff,
rested on discrepancies in the generally-accepted accounts of Dillinger's death
by gunfire in 1934.225 An episode of CBS's Simon and Simon television series
toyed with the same premise.226 Inan opinion by Judge Easterbrook, the court
noted that intellectual advancement requires authors to "build[] on the work of
others," and it refused to treat the Dillinger theory differently merely because
it was novel and speculative:
Nash does not portray The Dillinger Dossier and its companion
works as fiction... which makes all the difference. The inventor of
Sherlock Holmes controls that character's fate while the copyright
lasts; the first person to conclude that Dillinger survived does not get
dibs on history. If Dillinger survived, that fact is available to all.
Nash's rights lie in his expression: in his words, in his arrangement
220. Id. at 975-76.
221. Id. at 976.
222. Id. at 974. See also Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implicationsfor Copyright, 29
J. ODPYRIGHT SOC'Y 560, 591 (1982) (imagining a theory of history-that Jones, rather than Booth,
assassinated Lincoln-so original that it qualifies as "novel" and 'bear[s] much more (than the mere
unearthing of an artifact] the individual stamp of the historian's own wit and imagination," but
concluding that such a theory should not be copyrightable: "The hypothesis ... purports to be an
inference about an actual historical event; whether rooted in circumstantial or direct evidence, it is
essentially a 'discovery' which § 102(b) declares to fall outside the protection of copyright.").
223. Hoehling,618 F.2d at 978.
224. Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1538 (7th Cir. 1990).
225. Id. at 1538.
226. Id.
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of facts (his deployment of narration interspersed with interviews,
for example), but not in the naked "truth."22
If an author presents a theory as fact, it is perhaps only reasonable to treat it as
a fact, however improbable it may be. 228 Taking the author at his word also
227. Id. at 1541.
228. Authors of factual works sometimes include "facts" known to be false. Mapmakers, for
example, are known to include fictional towns and streets in out-of-the-way corners. These
"copyright traps" provide convenient and irrefutable evidence of copying. Such "facts" are original in
the copyright sense, since they have their origin in the author's imagination, but courts have treated
false facts in the same manner as true facts. In Nester's Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co.,
796 F. Supp. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), for example, the plaintiff published a guide to New York City for
taxi drivers, in which many of the street addresses were merely approximate. Id. at 731-33. The
addresses were changed "in order both to detect copying and to make them easier to remember." Id.
at 732-33. Nester argued that "since these numbers are invented, they should be copyrightable like
other works of fiction." Id. at 733. Employing a theory of "copyright estoppel," the court barred
Nester from relying on its imaginary "facts":
To treat "false" facts interspersed among actual facts and represented as actual
facts as fiction would mean that no one could ever reproduce or copy actual facts
without risk of reproducing a false fact and thereby violating a copyright. If
such were the law, information could never be reproduced or widely
disseminated.
Id.; see also Houts v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 26, 28 (C.D. Cal. 1984) ("Under the
doctrine of copyright estoppel, once a plaintiff's work has been held out to the public as factual the
author-plaintiff cannot then claim that the book is, in actuality, fiction and thus entitled to the higher
protection allowed to fictional works."); Skinder-Strauss Assocs. v. Mass. Continuing Legal Educ.,
Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665, 675-76 (D. Mass. 1995) ("If copying true facts is permissible, it is immaterial
whether [the defendant] copied false facts or 'seeds' [referring to fictitious attorney names inserted
into a legal directory for the express purpose of detecting copying]."); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) (referring to fictitious listings in the copied telephone directory).
This treatment of "false facts" does not extend to genuine works of fiction, as the defendant
discovered in Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The defendant published a quiz book, called the Seinfeld Aptitude Test, or "SAT,"
based on the characters and events of the popular television series. Id. at 261-62. The defendant
claimed that it had copied no expression, but only 'tncopyrightable facts about the Seinfeld show."
Id. at 266. The court rejected the "false premise":
SAT does not pose "factual" questions about the Seinfeld show; it does not ask
who acts in the program, who directs or produces the show, how many seasons it
has run, etc. Instead, SAT poses questions about the events depicted during
episodes of the Seinfeld show. The facts depicted in a Seinfeld episode,
however, are quite unlike the facts depicted in a biography, historical text, or
compilation. Seinfeld is fiction; both the "facts" in the various Seinfeld episodes,
and the expression of those facts, are plaintiffs creation.... [Bgy copying "facts"
that plaintiff invented, SAT "appropriate[s] [plaintiffs] original contributions."
Thus, to find in defendant's favor merely by rote application of the rule against
affording copyright protection to facts would be to divorce that rule from its
underlying rationale.
Simply put, and of most direct concern under the
Copyright Act, defendants have appropriated original elements of plaintiffs
work.
Id. at 266 (citation omitted). One can always characterize the elements of a work of fiction as facts
about the work. In that sense, it is a "fact" that Hamlet speaks to the ghost of his father, since it is a
fact that Shakespeare's play includes such a scene. However, such "facts" are both original to the
author and inseparable from the author's expression. The difference between false facts and "fictional
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relieves the court of the burden of deciding whether a theory is true, or merely
a product of the author's imagination.229
D. Matters of Opinion
Some propositions are either true or false. Although the truth may never be
known, and forgetting for the moment the quantum-physics limbo endured by
Shroedinger's cat, we can be confident that John Dillinger either did or did not
die in 1934, and Eric Spehl either did or did not sabotage the Hindenburg We
cannot say, in the same way, that "Ozymandius" is or is not a great poem; that
based on an author's taste
is a matter of taste, not a matter of fact. Selections
230
have been treated as protectable expression.
In Eckes v. Card Prices Update,23' the Second Circuit held a baseball card
With entries for
price guide to be an original work of authorship.232
facts" is one of presentation. The first are presented as truths about the world, and courts treat them
as such; the latter are presented as expressions of the author's fancy, and courts properly afford them
the protections that the copyright laws intend. Some works of fiction, such as Umberto Eco's The
Name of the Rose and the recent film The Blair Witch Project, purport to be factual works based on
discovered material. A thin veneer of authenticity applied for artistic purposes may assist in the
suspension of disbelief, but only the most gullible would be deceived. It is unlikely that a court would
treat such works as factual.
229. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The cases
in this circuit ... make clear that factual information is in the public domain. Each appellee had the
right to 'avail himself of the facts contained' in Hoehling's book and to 'use such information,
whether correct or incorrect, in his own literary work."' (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). In
UrantiaFoundation v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the revelations of "celestial beings" were an appropriate subject matter for copyright. Id. at 956.
Although the court may have doubted the origin and accuracy of these revelations, the court treated
them as authentic-as both the plaintiff and the defendant in the case had done. Id. at 958. That
raised certain problems for the plaintiff, analogous to those suffered by authors who promote their
theories as "the truth." "At the very least, for a worldly entity to be guilty of infringing a copyright,
that entity must have copied something created by another worldly entity." Id. Nevertheless, the
court found the selection and arrangement of revelations sufficient to render the plaintiff's work
original. Id. at 959.
230. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Some
directories are considered original works because of the labor expended in their preparation. Other
compilations, however, are protected because the author exercised subjective judgment and selectivity
in choosing items to list." (citation omitted)). Dow Jones refers to two cases protecting factual
compilations based on the "subjective judgment" involved in their assembly. Id. Both, however,
appear to rest on pre-Feist "sweat of the brow" prohibitions. See supra note 134. One case, List Pub.
Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772 (S.D.N.Y 1887), concerned a society directory listing persons "supposed tobe
people of fashion." Id. at 772. The court observed that the defendant had "no right to take, for the
purposes of a rival publication, the results of the labor and expense incurred by the complainant." Id.
at 773. The other case, Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th
Cir. 1942), involved, as one would imagine, a directory of quality restaurants. Id.at 811. As in List
Pub., the court suggested that any directory can be duplicated only if the newcomer works "from
scratch," as opposed to taking advantage of the first author's labor. Id. at 812-13.
231. 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
232. Id. at 863.
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approximately 18,000 cards, Eckes' guide was "a comprehensive listing of
baseball cards manufactured ... from 1909 to 1979., '233 The author, James
Beckett, selected 5,000 of those cards as "premium" cards commanding a
correspondingly premium price.234 In distinguishing between the "premium"
and the "common," Beckett "rei[ied] on his extensive knowledge of trading in
baseball cards and his background in statistics." 235 The defendant's guide,
styled a price "update," listed separately only premium cards, but those cards
were the same 5,000 selected in the Eckes guide. 23 6 The defendant also
237
duplicated some of the prices, pictures, and mistakes in the original.' 238
Conceding that "[c]opyright law and compilations are uneasy bedfellows,
the court held that the "selection" of premium cards in the Eckes guide merited
copyright protection.23 9 The court concluded that Beckett "exercised selection,
creativity and judgment in choosing among the 18,000 or so different baseball
cards in order to determine which were the 5,000 premium cards. ' 2 °
Eckes is noteworthy in two respects. First, the court refers to Beckett's
creative "selection" of premium cards, echoing the language of the Copyright
Act which defines a "compilation" as "a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship." 24' The definition would apply to collections
such as "Favorite Poems" or "Healthy Recipes," where authors exercise their
creativity by choosing what to include. Beckett's guide, however, seems to
have been a comprehensive one, listing all baseball cards produced in a given
period.242 Beckett did not "select" certain cards for inclusion in the guide, but
rather "selected" certain cards as worthy of "premium" status.243 It is not self-

233. Id. at 860.
234. Id. at 860.
[T]hey are considered particularly valuable because of the player featured on the
card, e.g., a hall of famer, a rookie of the year, or because of the team on which
he plays, or because of some characteristic of the card itself, such as an
imperfection or the scarcity of the card.
Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 860-61.
237. Id. at 861.
238. Id. at 862.
239. Id. at 862-63. Employing a double negative, the court observed: "[O]ur cases do not hold
that subjective selection and arrangement of information does not merit protection. In fact, the
definition of a compilation in the Act, the commentators, and the cases, suggest that selectivity in
including otherwise non-protected information can be protected expression." Id. (citations omitted).
240. Id. at 863.
241. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).
242. Eckes, 736 F.2d at 860.
243. Id.
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evident that this is the kind of "selection" contemplated in the statute. 244 On
the other hand, if the question is one of creativity, whether Beckett excluded
common cards from the collection or merely labeled them as such seems to
make no difference.
Second, if Beckett had selected as "premium" cards those which gave him
the greatest pleasure, or if in some other way he had employed entirely
subjective criteria, one could easily say that the selection "owes its origin" to
the author. 245 But Beckett's selection of "premium" cards was determined in
part by the marketplace-hence the need to exercise his "extensive knowledge
of trading in baseball cards and his background in statistics." 246 Market price
is a factor largely external to Beckett;247 consequently, one could question
whether his selection was "original" in the copyright sense. An accurate
assessment of the market no doubt requires judgment and experience, and the
results may be speculative, but the same considerations apply to theories of
history which, as we have seen, have been held lacking in originality. 248. Still,
the result in Eckes may be correct. If baseball cards command a range of
prices, as one assumes they do, Beckett must have drawn the line between
"premium" and "common" somewhat arbitrarily. 249 If so, one could argue that
even if card prices are facts external to Beckett, the distinction between
"premium" and "common" "has its origins" with Beckett. Because a different
distinction might have made the guide less useful or appealing, it is also a
choice related to form and presentation as well as content.
Later cases adopting the result of Eckes seem oblivious to its difficulties.
The Second Circuit considered the copyrightability of the Red Book guide to
used car prices in CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market
Reports, Inc.250 The defendant duplicated large portions of the Red Book data
in its own database, 25 1 but the district court found that the car prices were not
"original:" "While Maclean Hunter [the author of the Red Book] may have
been first to discover and report this material, the material does not 'owe its
origin' to Maclean Hunter."252 The appellate court reversed.253 The figures in
244. Possibly Beckett's identification of premium cards should be considered a matter of
"coordination" or "arrangement," rather than "selection."
245. See supra text accompanying note 81.
246. Eckes, 736 F.2d at 860.
247. A price guide may influence prices in the marketplace, but it seems to have been Beckett's
intention to report market conditions rather than to determine them.
248. See supra notes 216-227 and accompanying text.
249. If the choice were arbitrary to the extent of randomness, there would be some authority for
holding it unoriginal. See Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986).
250. 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994).
251. Id. at 64. The defendant sometimes used the Red Book data as is, and sometimes averaged
its prices with those listed in the similar Bluebook. Id.
252. Id. at 66-67.
253. Id. at 63.
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the Red Book, it observed, are not historical market prices but "predictions,
based on a wide variety of informational sources and . . . professional
judgment. ' , 25 Because the numbers were based
on "judgment and expertise,"
255
they must be considered "original creations."
In several respects, CCC is more troubling than Eckes. In Eckes, the sharp
division of cards into "commcn" and "premium" is a device that has no
precise analog in the marketplace, and thus can be considered the author's
"original" creation. In contrast, in CCC the court suggests that the prices
themselves, which presumably are as close to reality as the authors could make
them, are "original" because they are estimates. 256 Many facts can only be
estimated. It is difficult to imagine a court holding an estimated value of
gravity to be a figure protected by copyright, even if some "judgment and
expertise" went into its formulation. 257 CCC also strains the concept of
"selection," as it is used in the definition of "compilation."' 258 The authors of
the Red Book "selected" their prices by choosing them from a multitude of
possibilities, but this is not selection in the sense of determining which
materials to include in a collection and which to omit. If § 101 referred to data
"selected, coordinated, arranged or devised in such a way that the resulting
work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship," one could make a
better case that estimated prices are "original."
The court argues that information such as the Red Book prices must be
protected or the public welfare will suffer:
Compilations that devise new and useful selections and
arrangements of information unquestionably contribute to public
knowledge by providing cheaper, easier, and better organized access
to information. Without financial incentives, creators of such useful
compilations might direct their energies elsewhere, depriving the
public of
their creations and impeding the advancement of
2 59
learning.

254. Id.
255. Id. at 67. See also Marshall & Swift v. BS & A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Mich.
1994). In Marshall & Swift, the court held copyrightable tables of estimated value used by assessors,
even though the values were the product of mathematical formulas and represented as "true cash
value." Id. at 959. The court described the values as "a product ofjudgment" exhibiting the necessary
"creative spark." Id. at 960-61. "Even if Marshall's creative process consists in part of 'plugging'
numbers into a formula and tabulating the results, an element of original selection-from a virtual
universe of information-is inherently a part of this process." Id at 960.
256. CCC, 44 F.3d at 67.
257. Such "judgment and expertise" might come into play, for example, if scientists discounted
the values produced by certain experiments which, in according to their "judgment and expertise,"
were prone to error.
258. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
259. CCC,44 F.3d at 66.
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Identical reasoning could be applied to fact gathering. Facts unquestionably
contribute to public knowledge, and if facts are not subject to copyright those
who gather them may "direct their energies elsewhere." 26° Yet the Supreme
Court has held unequivocally, either in spite of the Constitution's concern for
the public welfare or because of it, that facts are not "original" and are not
copyrightable. 261 The same could be said of estimated facts, and with much
the same justifications.
Furthermore, in addressing the argument that
estimated prices are "ideas" rather than the expression of ideas,
the court
overstates its case when it warns that "if CCC's argument prevails ... virtually
nothing will remain of the protection accorded by the statute to compilations,
notwithstanding the express command of the copyright statute." 263 Something
would remain-namely, the protection of any original "selection, coordination
and arrangement" of prices. The author might not consider that protection
enough, but it would prevent at least the easiest and most mechanical
duplication of creatively presented information. In fact, the Red Book itself
may have included such creativity, since it estimated prices by geographic
regions, the selection of which may have been as arbitrary as the distinction
between "common" and "premium" cards in Eckes.264 However, any case that
could be made for creative presentation is lost in the court's insistence that
265 the
facts themselves are protectable, because they are "infused with opinion." 266
The Ninth Circuit reached similar conclusions in CDN Inc. v. Kapes,
where the copyrighted works were lists of estimated wholesale coin prices.
Here the issues were presented even more starkly:
Whether CDN's selection and arrangement of the price lists is
sufficiently original to merit protection is not at issue here. CDN
does not allege that Kapes copied the entire lists, as the alleged
infringer had in Feist. Rather, the issue in this case is whether the
prices themselves
are sufficiently original as compilations to sustain
267
a copyright.
At the "heart of the case" lay "[t]he distinction between facts and non-facts,
and between discovery and creation." 268 "Discoverable facts," the court
admitted, "are not copyrightable." 269 Coin prices, on the other hand, are not
historical facts based on actual transactions, but values derived by "using [the
260. Id.
261.
262.

See supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.

263. CCC, 44 F.3d at 70.
264.

See id. at 67.

265. Id. at 72-73.
266. 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999).
267.

Id. at 1259.

268. Id.
269. Id.
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authors'] judgment to distill and extrapolate from factual data., 270 The faint
spark of creativity demanded by Feist "glows in CDN's prices, which are
compilations of data chosen and weighed with creativity and judgment." 271
The district court characterized each CDN price as a "'best guess' as to
what the current 'bid' and 'ask' price should be." 272 Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit described the prices as whatever the authors, "in their best judgment,"
273
thought would 'Yepresent[] the value of [the] item as closely as possible."
The court's language suggests that there is a true price for each coin which the
authors sought to approximate, presumably with some success. But because
the methodology was imperfect, and dependent on "expertise and judgment,"
the court held the CDN prices sufficiently creative and original to be
copyrighted. 274 The implications are far-reaching. Any reported facts that
depend on judgment and approximation-crowd estimates, the age of
antiquities, weather forecasts and medical diagnoses, to name just a fewcould be considered copyrightable subject matter by the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning.
One could argue that a collection of estimates, such as a price list, should
be treated differently than any particular estimate, perhaps because of the
Copyright Act's explicit protection of "compilations." 27 5 However, once the
estimates are judged original in themselves, and not because of the manner in
which they are selected or arranged, one faces the common sense observation
in Feist that "100 uncopyrightable facts do not magically change their status
when gathered together in one place., 276 More plausibly, one could argue that
a price is not like other facts. Perhaps there is no such thing as a "tue" coin
price, or an "actual value," since price and value are always dependent on the
changing and sometimes arbitrary desires of buyers and sellers. Perhaps the
pretense of assigning a price to a coin is more fiction than fact. But whatever
merits that line of argument might have, the Ninth Circuit did not rely upon it.
Finally, one might characterize the CDN coin prices as a vehicle for
presenting complex data. In other, less controversial cases, courts have held
270.
271.

Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1260.

As in CCC, the court appeals to policy:

"Drawing this line preserves the

balance between competition and protection: it allows CDN's competitors to create their own price
guides and thus furthers competition, but protects CDN's creation, thus giving it an incentive to create
such a guide." Id. at 1262. Again, the same argument could be used in support of copyrighting facts.
Extending the protections of copyright to reported facts arguably would "preserve[] the balance
between competition and protection" by allowing authors to gather their own facts in competition
with a first author (perhaps collecting them more accurately, as well) while protecting the "creation"
of the first author and the "incentive" to gather facts. Id That view of the appropriate competitive
balance would, nevertheless, be inconsistent with Feist and 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
272. CDN, 197 F.3d at 1260.
273. Id. at 1261.
274. Id. at 1260.
275. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
276. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
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that a particularly useful or concise presentation of facts is original and worthy
of copyright protection. For example, in U.S. Payphone, Inc. v. Executives
Unlimited of Durham, Inc.,277 the Fourth Circuit held copyrightable a
publication distilling complicated public domain payphone tariff information
into a convenient one-page-per-state format. 278 CDN suggests that coin price
lists serve a similar function:
If CDN merely listed historical facts of actual transactions, the
guides would be long, cumbersome, and of little use to anyone.
Dealers looking through such data would have to use their own
judgment and expertise to estimate the value of a coin. What CDN
own judgment and expertise in arriving at that
has done is to use its279
value for the dealers.
In a sense, the CDN price lists condense complicated data into something
briefer and more useful, but the same could be said of the product of any
research. Anyone interested in the fate of the Hindenburg would find the
theory of Eric Spehl's sabotage more convenient than the stack of evidence
from which it was derived. Just as the sabotage theory is more than a concise
summary of the evidence, the CDN prices are more than a distillation of price
data. They are the authors' best estimates of what the coins are actually worth.
E. Predictions
Predicting the future is, inevitably, an art "infused with opinion., 28 ) Price
guides can be described as predictions, 28 ' or as reflections, however imperfect,
of the current state of the marketplace. Other copyrighted works are more
explicitly concerned with future events. Because few things are as useful as
accurately predicting the future, such works raise difficult issues under the
idea/expression,282 fact/expression
and process/expression dichotomies.284
Not long after the Supreme Court decided Feist,28 5 the Second Circuit, in
Kregos v. Associated Press,28 6 addressed the copyrightability of a "pitching
277. Nos. 89-1081, 89-1085, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 7599 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 1991).
278. Id. at *8. The copyrightability of the format could have been questioned if there had been
only a limited number of ways to present the information, see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying
text, but the court found that the information "could have been organized in many different ways." Id.
at *6.
279. CDN, 197 F.3d at 1261.
280. CCC Info. Servs., Inc., v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir.

1994).
281.
will pay,
282.
283.
284.
285.

They are predictions in the sense of guessing what sellers will demand, and what buyers
for a particular item. Id. at 63.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part lI.B.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra notes 122-134, 136-142 and accompanying text.
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form" listing baseball player statistics.28 7
Although other pitching forms
predated Kregos' form, his was the first to list nine categories of data
concerning the previous performances of the pitchers matched for an
upcoming game.28 8 The defendant, Associated Press, published a pitching
form virtually identical to Kregos' form. 289 The district court granted summary
judgment for AP, holding, among other things, that Kregos' selection of
statistics lacked originality, and that the idea of the form had merged 290 with its
expression. 291 The Second Circuit reversed, drawing parallels between
Kregos' 2 selection of statistics and Eckes' selection of "premium" baseball
29
cards:

The universe of known facts available only from inspection of box
scores of prior games is considerably greater than nine, though
perhaps not as great as the quantity of 18,000 cards in Eckes. For
example, Kregos could have selected past performances from any
number of recent starts, instead of using the three most recent starts.
And he could have chosen to include strikeouts, walks, balks, or hit
batters. By consulting play-by-play accounts of games, instead of
box scores, he could have counted various items such as the number
of innings in which the side was retired in order, or in which no
runner advanced as far as second base. Or he could have focused on
performance under pressure by computing the percentage of innings
in which a runner scored out of total innings in which a runner
reached second base, and he could have chosen to calculate this
statistic for any number of recent starts. In short, there are at least
scores of available statistics about pitching performance available to
be calculated from the underlying data and therefore thousands of
combinations 293
of data that a selector can choose to include in a
pitching form.

Since Kregos had chosen his nine statistics from a wealth of possibilities,
the
294
court found his selection "creative" inthe sense required by Feist.
Of course, it was no accident that Kregos' form reported earned run
averages rather than hot dog sales; Kregos evidently considered these nine

286. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
287. Id. at 701.
288. Id. at 702. The categories included the pitchers' won/lost records and earned run averages
for the entire season; their won/lost records, innings pitched and earned run averages for the entire
season, against the opposing team at the site of the game; and their won/lost records, innings pitched,
earned run averages and men-on-base averages for their last three starts. Id.
289. Id.
290. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
291. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 702.
292. See supra notes 231-240 and accompanying text.
293. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 704.
294. Id. at 705.
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statistics to be the most useful for picking a winner.295 Yet the court did not
regard the selection as an "idea., 296 "Every compiler of facts has the idea that
his particular selection of facts is useful," the court observed.297
If the compiler's idea is identified at that low level of abstraction,
then the idea would always merge into the compiler's expression of
it .... However, if the idea is formulated at a level of abstraction
has made, then
above the particular selection of facts the compiler
29
merger of idea and expression is not automatic. 8
Similarly, Kregos' form was something more (or something less) than a
"system" for predicting outcomes. 299 The form reported "facts that [Kregos
thought] newspaper readers should consider in making their own predictions
of outcomes," but it did not do the work for them. 30 Kregos did not "weight
the nine statistics, much less provide a method for comparing the aggregate
value of one pitcher's statistics against that of the opposing pitcher in order to
30
' He had simply "compiled facts, or at least categories
predict an30 outcome."
2
facts."
of
The court "confess[ed] . . . some unease," given the potential for
monopolizing an idea by copyrighting a particular selection of data. 30 3 A
doctor, for example, might publish a list of symptoms used to diagnose a
disease. 304 Even if other symptoms could be selected for the same purpose,
there would be "a substantial question" of copyrightability; 3 5 the selection of
symptoms might represent the "idea" of diagnosis based on those particular
symptoms, which could be expressed only in that list. 306 That concern did not
prevail here, apparently because Kregos' selection of statistics involved "taste
295. Id. at 707 ("[Kregos] is doing more than simply saying that he holds the opinion that his
nine performance characteristics are the most pertinent. He implies that his selections have some
utility inpredicting outcomes.").
296. Id. at 706.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any... system ... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work." (emphasis added)).
300. Kregos,937 F.2d at 706.
301. Id.
Like the compilers of horse racing statistics, Kregos has been content to select
categories of data that he obviously believes have some predictive power, but
has left it to all sports page readers to make their own judgments as to the likely
outcomes from the sets of data he has selected.
Id. at 707.
302. Id. at 706.
303. Id. at 707.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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and personal opinion,, 30 7 and did not, without further analysis, predict any
future outcome. 3 8 The court described a "continuum spanning matters of pure
taste to matters of predictive analysis," and held Kregos' selection of statistics
near enough to the "taste" 3 9end of the spectrum to avoid any question of
monopolizing a useful idea. 0
Judge Sweet, writing in dissent, struggled to distinguish between the
majority's medical diagnosis example and the predictive function of Kregos'
statistics: "In both cases, the creators have conceived very precise 'ideas'
concerning the significant data which ought to be considered in predicting a
given result, and those ideas can be expressed only by identifying the relevant
data., 310 Even if medicine is "more socially beneficial than a system for
estimating sports odds," the distinction, argued Judge Sweet, "does not offer311
a
basis for denying copyright protection to one while granting it to another."
Nor could one argue that diagnosis is "more 'scientific' and less 'creative'
than handicapping a baseball game. No doubt many people, including both
doctors and those who make their living, either legally or illegally, in the
sports gambling profession, would dispute such a claim. ' 312 Finally, Judge
Sweet regarded the majority's reasoning as inconsistent with the
process/expression dichotomy of Baker:31 3 "In my opinion, Kregos' form
constitutes an explanation of his preferred system of handicapping baseball
games, and he
seeks to use his copyright here to prevent others from practicing
' 314
that system.
Other critical observations can be added to those of Judge Sweet. First, it
is curious that the incompleteness of Kregos' system-i.e., his failure to
suggest how the statistics he identified should be used-leads to the
307.

Id.

308. Id.
309. Id.
His "idea," for purposes of the merger doctrine, remains the general idea that
statistics can be used to assess pitching performance rather than the precise idea
that his selection yields a determinable probability of outcome. Since there are
various ways of expressing that general idea, the merger doctrine need not be
applied to assure that the idea will remain in the public domain.
Id. (footnote omitted).
310. Id. at 711 (Sweet, J., dissenting in part).
311. Id. Distinguishing between different fields of endeavor based on their "social benefits"
might cause discomfort similar to what would be experienced if courts took on the role of art critics.
See supra note 100. Further, to discount the value of a particular set of statistics would be, in most
cases, to reject the judgment of both plaintiff and defendant, each of whom evidently regarded the
statistics as worthy of publication. On the other hand, if the boundary between idea and expression is
just a pragmatic one designed to promote healthy competition, see supra notes 49-50 and

accompanying text, one cannot entirely dismiss the notion of case-specific line drawing in which
courts take into account, among other things, the likely impact on society.
312. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 711 n.2 (Sweet, J., dissenting in part).
313. See supra Part II.C.
314. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 713 (Sweet, J., dissenting in part).
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conclusion that the statistics can be reserved to Kregos as his exclusive
property. Apparently, if Kregos had described a specific method of using
these statistics to predict an outcome, the court would have held that method
uncopyrightable. Yet, the very incompleteness of Kregos' system leads to a
broader monopoly; not just one method, but any method of using Kregos'
statistics, would be preempted by his copyright. Kregos' system is both less
useful and more all-encompassing than a more complete system which the
court would have committed to the public domain.
Second, one can question whether the court has properly imagined a
"continuum" between opposite poles of "pure taste" and "matters of predictive
analysis." 315 Many selections based on "pure taste" have nothing to do with
prediction, other than the prediction that readers will benefit from the
selection. A collection of "Amazing Facts About Alabama," for example,
predicts no outcome external to the reader's experience of the work. The court
seems to intend, rather, a distinction between highly speculative prediction
(perhaps so speculative as to be defensible only on the arbitrary grounds of
"taste") and more reliable, systematic or "scientific" prediction. As Judge
Sweet observes, it is difficult to draw such distinctions, given the manner
in
316
which art and science combine in most attempts to predict the future.
Finally, the court is so intent on denying that idea and expression have
merged, a concern pertinent only to the idea/expression dichotomy, the court
misses the separate concerns raised by the fact/expression and
process/expression dichotomies. If Kregos' list of statistics reflects a fact
about the game of baseball-that there is a correlation between pitchers'
relative performances in these areas and their likelihood of winning the next
game-then it should'make no difference whether there are other such
correlations to be discovered. Similarly, to the extent that Kregos' form is
necessary to use any system based on those statistics to predict the outcome of
a game, it should make no difference that other systems, using other statistics,
could be used instead. Although there are many systems of bookkeeping,
under Baker no one system can be monopolized by copyright.317
Equally troubling is Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Technology,
Inc.,3 1S decided by a district court in Texas. Compaq developed software for
warning a network administrator when disk drive failure could be imminent.31 °
The timing of a 'prefailure warning"-a warning based on a likelihood of
failure, rather than an actual problem--depended on five parameters selected
and monitored by Compaq. 320 The intention was to allow disk drives nearing
315.
316
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id. at 707.
Id. at 712-13 (Sweet, J., dissenting in part).
See supra text accompanying notes 107-115.
908 F. Supp. 1409 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
Id. at 1415.
Id.
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the end of their life cycles to be replaced before they actually failed.32' In
order to.make its own products compatible with the Compaq software, Procom
copied onto its disk drives data representing Compaq's "threshold values" for
the five failure-predicting parameters. 322 Compaq filed suit, arguing that the
threshold values were copyrighted.323
As in Kregos, the court held the values "original" because of the many
choices available to their "author":
Compaq had to determine both the number and the particular
parameters which it would monitor ....In addition, Compaq had to
decide upon the appropriate threshold value for each of the five
parameters selected. In selecting the threshold value, Compaq had
to consider the point at which the drive would actually fail and then
select a threshold that would be reached before actual failure.
However, Compaq did not want to set the prefailure point too early
in the life of the drive, otherwise Compaq would incur unnecessary
expenses [under its warranty program].324
Compaq could have chosen to monitor other parameters, or could have used
different threshold values for the same parameters. 325 The selections, the court
326
noted, were "based on both engineering and business related judgments,"
and they "reflect the requisite degree of creativity and judgment necessary to
' 327
[copyright the] compilation."
In addition, the court held that Compaq's threshold values were not facts
328
because they were not, like telephone numbers, "empirically verifiable."
They were, instead, the "result of a decision making process," and "more a
prediction than a fact., 3 29 Compaq's selection amounted to a "business
decision as to the point in the life of the drive that Compaq is willing to
replace it under its warranty program," 330 or even an "express[ion of] opinion"

321.

Id.
The prefailure warning program was developed as part of a warranty package
provided by Compaq to those customers who buy Compaq drives. When a hard
drive has degraded below a predetermined "threshold value," a prefailure
warning is triggered. Once this happens, Compaq will replace the drive that
triggered the warning even though it has not actually failed.

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
1416.
1413.
1415 (footnote omitted).
1418.
1415.
1418.
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regarding when a drive should be replaced.33' Other companies could express
their own opinions by choosing different thresholds.332
Applying copyright rules to data "understood" only by a machine333 is
frequently problematic, but both Congress and the courts have determined that
such data may be within the scope of copyright. 334 Deferring to that precedent,
the threshold values recorded on Compaq's disk drives should be no less
copyrightable than the same values would be if printed in a user's manual for
the benefit of a system administrator. Nevertheless, the question remains
whether those values, wherever they appear, are an "original" work of
authorship.
As in Kregos, the court concentrates on the problem of merger of idea and
expression, and solves it by finding that the author selected from a wide range
of available choices. 335 The court preempts the fact/expression dichotomy by
holding the threshold values an expression of "opinion," rather than a
statement of fact, a characterization which, presumably, also disposes of the
process/expression dichotomy. But the outcome is unsatisfying.
What
Compaq achieved was, in effect, a monopoly on its insights into disk drive
operation and business planning.
The former, especially, might be
characterized as discoveries, rather than creative expression. The point at
which a disk drive will fail is a fact, as is the relationship of any given set of
parameters to the life expectancy of the drive. Even if one can only guess at
those facts, it is unsettling to make Compaq's educated "best guess" the
subject of exclusive rights through copyright, rather than, perhaps, the patent
monopoly, which is devised with such useful ingenuity in mind. However
worthy Compaq's achievement, can it really be appropriate to treat the insights
of an engineer (or a warranty-minded accountant) on a par with those of the
author whose selection of poetry effectively communicates a mood? Is this
what Feist meant by "creativity?"

331.
332.

Id. at 1419.
Idat l41819.

333. Procom itself did not understand what the threshold data represented; it knew only that the
data had to be on its disk drives if they were to be compatible with the Compaq system. Id. at 1416.
334. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining a "computer program" as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result,"
and, by implication, including such programs within the subject matter of copyright); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that a
computer program is copyrightable as a "literary work," even when embodied in virtually unreadable
object code).
335. Compaq Computer, 908 F. Supp. at 1418-19.
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IV. RESTORING THE FEISTIAN BARGAIN
The recent cases imply a new copyright dichotomy, separating not fact and
expression but
fact and opinion, or, perhaps more accurately, "hard facts" and
"soft facts." 336 Hard facts are objective, unoriginal and in the public domain;
soft facts are subjective, original and copyrightable. Plausible as it may at first
appear, the distinction between public domain hard facts and copyrightable
soft facts has serious flaws.
A. DistinguishingFact and Opinion
Hard facts and soft facts differ only in objectivity. A telephone number is a
hard fact because the correct number is the correct number, regardless of the
point of view of the person who reports it. The telephone number for the
White House switchboard is (202) 456-1414. Unless I have it wrong, nothing
about that fact "owes its origin" to me. On the other hand, if I assign a value
of $16.09 to a 1924 Denver Mint buffalo nickel in fine condition, that value
may owe a great deal to me. Perhaps no other person would attribute precisely
that price to that coin. Other judgments and other experiences could lead to
other prices, some of which might be closer to the mean than others, but none
of which could be truly described as right or wrong. Nothing in the world "out
there" compels the choice of exactly $16.09. Hence, the courts might describe
me as the "author" of that coin price and, at least in the aggregate, might
consider my prices susceptible to copyright.
While the example suggests a clear distinction between uncopyrightable
hard facts and copyrightable soft facts, it is a distinction that in practice is
difficult to maintain. Indeed, one wonders whether there are enough hard facts
to preserve the principle of Feist that facts in general are uncopyrightable, or
whether the subjectivity exception would overwhelm the rule. Few facts are
entirely objective. Even as colorless a fact as "In 1970, the population of
Princeton, New Jersey, was 12,331,,, 337 owes something to its author. The
person who collects and reports that information has an idea of Princeton, New
Jersey as a distinct political or geographic entity, and 1970 as a distinct
division of time. These are conventional ideas, but ones derived from human
thought and culture rather than imposed by the world. Other elements built
into this fact are more personal. Census takers may have differing ideas of
"population." Some may include, or exclude, tourists, college students, the
homeless, legal or illegal aliens, people who only worked in Princeton, or
336. 1 use "hard facts" to refer to information, like telephone numbers, which is relatively
certain and independent of any point of view, and "soft facts" to refer to information, like price
forecasts, which is relatively uncertain and "infused with opinion."
337. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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people who lived in Princeton for only a portion of the year. Some may
calculate the population based on persons living in Princeton on January 1,
1970 or December 31, 1970. Some may take an average. The choice of
methodology is, in some sense, a matter of "opinion." This is not to suggest
that the reported population is nothing more than the census taker's fantasy, or
that one figure cannot be more accurate than another, but any census data is, at
least, the product of objective reality and subjective decisions rendered by the
census taker. One can imagine a census taker reciting the methodological
choices reflected in his data, just as photographers recite the choices of lens,
338
film, lighting and so forth that led to their individual renderings of a scene.
Philosophers would be particularly reluctant to recognize a category of
objectively ascertainable facts, many philosophers, particularly of the postmodem school, insisting that truth itself is a social construct. 339 That is not to
say that there is no world "out there, 340 rather that the world does not "split[]
34
itself up, on its own initiative, into sentence-shaped chunks called 'facts."' '
Vhat we call "facts," philosophers argue, are "the product[] of a highly
creative interaction between human minds and the cosmos."3 42
By
constraining the questions we ask of the world, such subjective elements as
personality and culture influence the answers we find. Benjamin Whorf, for
example, argued that much of our perception of the world is determined by
language. 343 As Whorf observed:
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.
The categories and types that we isolate from the world of
phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in
the face; 344 on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic
flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and
this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut
nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we
do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in
338. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. One could say, of this census example, that
there is only one "right answer" once the terms have been defined, but one could equally say of
photography that there is only one image to be recorded, once all of the photographer's choices have
been made. In either case, the creativity may be found in the preliminaries.
339. See THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRUTH: DE-CONFUSING AND RE-CONSTRUCTING THE

POSTMODERN WORLD 8 (Walter Truett Anderson ed., 1995).
340. Although Jaques Derrida famously declared 'Vl n "ya pas de hors-texte"-"there is nothing
outside of the text"-there are probably few philosophers who would deny the existence of a "real
world," even when they question our capacity to grasp it. Id. at 89, 8.
341. RORTY, supranote 1, at 5.
342. THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRUTH, supra note 339, at 8.
343.

BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY 213 (John B. Carroll ed.,

1956). Whorfs best-known example involves Eskimos and snow; Eskimos perceive differences in
snow because they have the vocabulary to describe each variety of snow distinctly, whereas, to the
inhabitants of more temperate regions, snow is snow, Id. at 216.
344. See discussion supra Part III.B (taxonomies as copyrightable subject matter).
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this way-an agreement that holds throughout our
speech
345
community and is codified in the patterns of our language.
Because of such language constraints, even the truths of science cannot be
entirely objective. "[N]o individual is free to describe nature with absolute
impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he
thinks himself most free." 346 If the public domain facts discussed in Feist are
only those uncorrupted by the author's point of view, Feist is a much less
significant case than most have supposed.
One might expect distinctions to break down in the rarified atmosphere of
philosophy, but even on the most practical level nagging questions remain. If
the application of "judgment and expertise" makes the prediction of a used car
price an "original creation," 347 why not a meteorologist's forecast, a
physician's diagnosis or an archaeologist's interpretation of an artifact? Why
not an historian's theory on the sabotage of the Hindenburg or the demise of
John Dillinger? 348 Is a controversial theory of physics any less "infused with
opinion" than a car price? If so, how much less "infused" must it be before it
enters the realm of the unprotectable?
Debates among scientists are commonplace, even when the scientists are
evaluating the same information. For example, astronomer David Black
contends that all of the extra-solar planets so far discovered "are actually misidentified stars." 3 49

Most astronomers, viewing the same data, strongly

disagree. 350 Independent researchers from Tel Aviv University agree with
Black that most of the identified planets are mis-identified stars, with two
exceptions. 35' Given the present state of knowledge, anyone's list of genuine
extra-solar planets is bound to be speculative, and to a degree personal. The
controversy over the Martian meteorite, said by some scientists
to contain
352
evidence of life, is a further example of "opinionated" science.

345. WHORF, supra note 343, at 213.
346. Id. at 214. Whorf rejected the notion of a "universe that can be 'found' independently by
all intelligent observers, whether they speak Chinese or Choctaw," which perhaps undercuts the
distinction between creation and discovery associated with the fact/expression dichotomy. Id. at 208;
see supra Part ll.B. Whorf still does not suggest that truth is entirely personal. He suggests, rather,
that perceptions of truth are different in different communities, speaking different languages. Id. at
214. Within any particular community, it would appear that truths could be "discovered" rather than
"created," at least so far as to justify treating those truths as common property rather than as the
property of their "author."
347. See supranote 255 and accompanying text.
348. See supra Part III.C.
349. George Musser, Lost Worlds, SC. AM., Jan. 2001, at 21.
350. Id.
351. Id. at21-22.
352. See Ron Cowen, Searchingfor Life in a Martian Meteorite: A Seesaw of Results, 150 SCL
NEWS 380, 380 (1996).
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One might conclude that most beliefs-even many we confidently label
facts-are personal and subjective, hence "creative" and copyrightable, yet we
cannot go so far without largely, or even entirely, abandoning what the Feist
Court called "the most fundamental axiom of copyright law., 353 Instead, we
are driven to the contrary conclusion: if subjectivity is an attribute of all facts,
one cannot rely upon it, unless in indeterminate matters of degree, to identify a
limited category of "opinionated" facts which are subject to copyright.
The soft facts distinction also runs contrary to the various dichotomies that
traditionally define the subject matter of copyright. 354 One engineer's (or
accountant's) "opinion" that an aging disk drive should be replaced today
rather than tomorrow may fairly be characterized as an idea about disk drive
maintenance (or good business practices) rather than the expression of an idea.
Compaq rejects that argument because "[t]here are numerous ways that a drive
supplier may express its opinion as to when it should replace its [disk]
drive[]. '' 355 Perhaps-but only if each disk drive manufacturer has a different
opinion or, in effect, a different idea. At best, the Compaq approach to the
idea/expression quandary begs the question; one must assume that Compaq's
"idea" lies at a higher level of abstraction than its particular choice of
parameters before one can conclude that the "idea" is capable of various
expressions. The same is true of the Kregos list of baseball statistics and the
prices quoted in the CCC and CDN guides.
The process/expression dichotomy is also a concern. Compaq's system can
be described as a method, or system, for predicting the failure of disk drives,
or at any rate, for optimizing the timing of their replacement. Such a method,
if it is non-obvious, is a candidate for patent protection, particularly now that
"methods of doing business" have been recognized as patentable subject
matter.356 Certainly it would be useful enough to satisfy the patent law
requirement of "utility. ' 357 Hence, Compaq's attempt to protect its parameters
as copyrightable "expression," no less than Selden's attempt to protect his
bookkeeping form, 358 seems an intrusion into the territory of patent law,
without the relatively short duration of monopoly, rigorous examination and
353. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991) ("The most
fundamental axiom of copyright law is that '[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he
narrates."' (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985))).
354. See supra Part 11.
355. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1419 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
356. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
357. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (patents awarded to inventors of "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"); Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg.
Gesellschaft m.b.H, 945 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("'All that the law requires is that the
invention should not be frivolous, or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or good morals of
society. The word useful therefore is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or
immoral."' (quoting In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 178-79 (1960))).
358. See supra text accompanying notes 107-115.
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disclosure quid pro quo that patent law demands. Every inventor may have a
different "opinion" regarding the optimal invention, but the product of an
inventor's labors is still the stuff of patents, not copyrights.
Finally, and most importantly, it is difficult to justify the exclusion of soft
facts from so fundamental a concept as the fact/expression dichotomy.
However opinionated or subject to error a soft fact may be, it reflects, or
purports to reflect, an external reality which "do[es] not owe [its] origin to an
act of authorship" 35 9-a discovery, not a creation. Compaq did not create the
physical laws or business considerations that make disk drive replacement at a
particular time more or less optimal. Kregos did not create the statistical
relationships implied by his choice of baseball statistics. Except to the extent
that their works are self-fulfilling prophecies, the authors of price guides do
not create the demand for certain cars or coins. How, then, can we justify
locking up such "un-original" insights in the long-lasting monopoly of
copyright?
Policy considerations add very little. While it is true that opinion-infused
facts are valuable and that their "authors" should be encouraged, hard facts are
also valuable, and those who discover them likewise should be encouraged.
Nevertheless, copyright law forbids a property interest in hard facts, favoring
public access over incentives. Perhaps soft facts, because they are more
speculative, are in some sense less useful than hard facts, so their authors'
exercise of dominion withholds less from the public domain. 360 Yet if soft
facts are less in demand than hard facts, one could argue that encouraging their
production through monopoly is proportionately less justified.
Any
differences between hard facts and soft facts, at least in terms of their
contributions to society, appear on both sides of the copyright equation and
seemingly cancel out.

B. Feist Revisited
On any question of copyright as it applies to factual works, Feist is the
preeminent authority. Predictably, the later "soft facts" decisions 361 make
reference to Feist, particularly in emphasizing the low threshold of
originality-phrased in Feist in terms of a "minimal level" of creativity,362 a

359. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
360. See Gorman, supra note 222 at 572-73 ("Permitting a monopoly against copying (even in
modestly embellished form) one's list of the fifty most livable cities in America will, because of the
very subjectivity involved in its compilation, not likely deprive the public of quite as significant
information as when the compilation is mechanical, streamlined, and exhaustive.").
361. E.g., CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1999); CCC Info. Servs., Inc., v.
Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1994).
362. Feist. 499 U.S. at 358.
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"not particularly stringent" requirement, 36 or a "creative spark." 364 Perhaps,
however, they pay too little heed to Feist's observations on the nature of
originality. Feist strongly, suggests that, in the case of factual works,
"originality" or "creativity" lies only in the manner of presentation. 365 In
discussing the copyrightability of compilations, the Court states: "Facts are
never original, so the compilation author can claim originality, if at all, only in
the way the facts are presented., 366 The way for the author to exhibit such
originality is primarily through the selection, coordination and arrangement of
the materials. 367
Feist does not hold that a spark of creativity at any stage of the production
of a written work suffices to make that work "original." On the contrary, by
rejecting copyright protection for collections of facts based on the labors of the
fact gatherer-the so-called "sweat of the brow"-Feist impliedly rejects
creativity in fact gathering as a relevant consideration. No matter how clever
the research techniques behind the telephone directory, and no matter how
indispensable they were to its contents, it is highly unlikely that the Feist
Court would have considered such creativity sufficient. As subsequent cases
have observed, 368 crediting originality in fact-gathering techniques, as opposed
to fact-expressing techniques, would contradict the Feist distinction between
creation and discovery. 369 For the same reason, the Feist Court almost
certainly would not have recognized creativity in formulating facts-whether
characterized as judgment, experience or opinion-as a source of
copyrightable originality. Originality in formulating facts, like originality in
gathering facts, is creativity that precedes expression, rather than being a part
of it. It may allow an author to convey a truer picture of the world, but that
truth is not of the author's making, and cannot belong to the author by
copyright.

363. Id.
364. Id. at 359.
365. Id. at 358.
366. Id. (emphasis added). In other instances the court similarly focuses on creativity in
presentation or expression, as opposed to creativity in substance. See, e.g., id. at 348.
Factual compilations . . . may possess the requisite originality. The compilation
author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them, and
how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by
readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made
independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are
sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compilations through the
copyright laws.

Id.
367.

Id. at 358. Originality might also subsist in the particular language chosen to express a

fact. See supra note 7.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 151-158.
369. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
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C. A Suggested Approach
The approach to factual works that is most consistent with Feist is to seek
out originality only in expression or presentation. Original language, or an
original arrangement of materials, should be subject to copyright, at least as
long as alternative means exist to express the same facts. What should not be
subject to copyright is anything that reflects, or purports to reflect, a truth
about the world external to the author and his works. Such truths, whether
they are presented uncorrupt and unarguable or through the fallible lens of
opinion, should become a part of the public domain, just as an author's ideas
become a part of the public domain.370
Collections of facts, like the directories considered in Feist, should be held
copyrightable, as long as the selection, coordination and/or arrangement of
facts is minimally creative, and as long as other selections, coordinations and
arrangements can serve equally well. Coordination and arrangement are, in
most cases, matters of presentation rather than substance. Coin prices are
precisely the same, whether they are organized by value, by type of coin, or by
the year the coins were minted, and no matter how various lists are crossreferenced. Such choices are not constrained by any circumstance external to
the work. "Selection" must be looked at more carefully. One could say that
the author of a coin price guide "selects" $16.09 as the price of a coin, instead
of $16.08 or $16.10. Such selection is more than a matter of presentation, at
least to the extent that it represents the author's best guess as to what the
coin's value actually is. Similarly, a musicologist's list of all authentic pieces
by J. S. Bach, based as it may be on the musicologist's golden ear and
subjective judgment, purports to reflect a truth about Bach that would exist,
and did exist, independently of its author. Other musicologists should be
privileged to reproduce that list, just as they could reproduce newly-discovered
facts about Bach's personal
relationships or financial condition. Any other
371
result contradicts Feist.
Some "selections" are matters of presentation and do qualify as creative
expression. The map maker who chooses to include some streets but not
others is making a choice as to the most convenient way, or most aesthetically
370. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
371. Authors might respond that their works are so speculative that they are unlikely to reflect
the true state of affairs. Perhaps the author of the coin price guide would admit a margin or error, and
the musicologist would expect a few mistakes. If authors are prepared to market their works as fact,
rather than fiction, they might with some justice be considered estopped to claim otherwise, as is
usually the case with "false facts." In any event, exceptions based on the unreliability or subjectivity
of the reported facts would call on courts to draw difficult, and perhaps ultimately impossible,
distinctions. All facts lie on a continuum of subjectivity, and neither copyright law nor copyright
precedent tell us where to draw a line. The line that Feist suggests is not between subjective and
objective, but between creation and discovery, or, to put it another way, between the authors who
describe the world and the world they purport to describe.
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pleasing way, to present a subset of the available information. Only if the
selection reflected an external circumstance not of the author's making (e.g.,
the map illustrated all interstate highways but no lesser roads) could the
to embody information about the world that belongs in the
selection be held
372
public domain.
Other "selections" are less obviously matters of presentation, but equally
reflect the author's taste and imagination, rather than the discoverable world.
An example can be found in Worth v. Selchow & Righter, Co. 373 The plaintiff,
Fred L. Worth, compiled a two-volume work he called "The Complete
Unabridged Super Trivia Encyclopedia., 374 Based on information derived
from books, films and television shows, each book included 6,000 items,
arranged alphabetically by subject matter headings. 375 Worth's goal was to
collect and present "interesting and trivial facts" as well as "facts that are
difficult to find."' 376 Worth charged that the creators of the board game Trivial
Pursuit had appropriated many of their questions and answers from the
materials collected in his books. 377 He lost the case because the court found
the works lacking in substantial similarity, 378 but the originality of Worth's
372. In spite of the concerns raised by the process/expression dichotomy, see supra Part II.C,
few courts would deny copyright to some manners of expression simply because they are more useful
than other manners of expression. The compiler of the "Chinese yellow pages" in Key, for example,
chose listings which she considered most useful for her audience, thereby producing a unique
directory. Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.
1991); see also Nester's Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp. 729, 732, 735
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (The author of a city guide "selected only the important and most helpful cross
streets based upon his knowledge of New York," and that selection, based upon the author's
"knowledge and judgment as to their usefulness to a cab driver," was copyrightable; however,
mileage estimates included in the same guide were uncopyrightable, even though "the distances are
not precise by the standards of a topographical survey."). One could argue that the selection was the
author's attempt to approximate the most useful directory possible, and that the nature of the most
useful directory is determined by the needs of the audience-a matter external to the author's
imagination, and in a sense a "fact" about the world. Yet the Feist Court almost certainly would not
have denied protection to a less mechanically-organized directory simply because it was useful, nor
would such an approach fit well with the protections long given to factual works such as maps and
charts. When the author of a factual work chooses a particular means of expression, or a particular
selection, coordination or arrangement of facts, because it is perceived to be useful, at least it is a
choice of presentation. It concerns the nature of the work itself, and does not exist independently of
the work. The protection of such communicative selections fits more comfortably with the
dichotomies of copyright than the protection of even "opinionated" facts, which do have an existence
independent of the work.
373. 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987).
374. Id. at 570.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 573.
The arrangement of Worth's book was not copied: His factual entries are
arranged in alphabetical order; the Trivial Pursuit questions and answers are
organized and color-coded by subject matter and are randomly arranged on each
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compilation is indisputable. Although the individual facts he reported were
discoveries, the selection was Worth's creation. It owed
nothing to the world
379
external to Worth's individual taste and imagination.
This kind of creativity can be recognized in factual works, and protected by
copyright, without doing violence to the separation of fact and expression, or
creation and discovery. The creativity exhibited in the CDN coin prices, the
car prices collected in the Red Book, or the Compaq parameters, is a different
matter. These are "selected" for their perceived fidelity to a reality "out
there." There is creativity in the sense that subjective judgments have been
brought to bear; only these authors, with their individual experiences and
opinions, could produce exactly these works. To that extent, the works "owe
their origin" to their authors. But their judgments, subjective or not, are
directed at a reality beyond themselves and their individual beliefs. 380
The place to draw the copyright line is not between objective and
subjective accounts of the world, but between what one could call reporting
and taste. The musicologist's collection of authentic pieces by Bach is an
example of the former, however tentative, even individual, a report it may be.
A collection of favorite pieces by Bach is an example of the latter, based on
the author's aesthetic perceptions rather than any discoverable property of the
world. 381 Such a collection fits far better within the framework of copyright
game card. As for the selection, although Worth's books were the source for
many questions, the entire selection of facts in the books and game cards is not
substantially similar.
Id.
379. Robert Gorman suggests a similar analysis for a collection of public-domain piano pieces,
arranged in order of difficulty:
I can surely secure copyright protection for the sequencing, which represents my
subjective judgment (i.e., authorship) regarding increased complexity of
execution. I suggest too that the very selection of the pieces, apart from their
sequencing, constitutes sufficient authorship for purposes of copyright
protection, reflecting an overall judgment regarding the technique-building and
pleasant-listening qualities of the pieces chosen.
Gorman, supra note 222, at 572 n.30; see also Denicola, supra note 5, at 530 (arguing that a
"collection owes its origin to the author as much as does the manner in which the collection is
arranged."). I agree that the selection should be copyrightable, at least to the extent that it is based on
taste (i.e., "pleasant-listening qualities") rather than external factors; I am less convinced that the
sequence should be protected if it is dictated by "increased complexity of execution," which seems an
organization based on judgments about the nature of the public-domain music and the capabilities of
pianists, rather than the purely creative faculties of the compiler.
380. A coin price directory might be creative in the sense of Worth's trivia books if, for
example, the author chose which coins would be "interesting" to include. However, in CDN, the
court found creativity in the prices themselves, not in their selection, coordination or arrangement.
See supra text accompanying note 267,
38 1. See Ginsburg, supra note 31, at 345 ("Feist does not challenge or undermine the longstanding principle that a subjective selection of information, such as the 'best' baseball players or the
most socially prominent families, satisfies the minimal creativity standard."). I disagree with
Ginsburg, to some extent. The principles of Feist do undermine the potential copyrightability of any
such selection, to the extent that the selection purports to mimic some aspect of the external world. If
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than the collection of "authentic" pieces by Bach, even if the latter is based
upon highly subjective judgments regarding what sounds, or does not sound,
genuine.
Where aesthetics are concerned there is no such thing as a "fact." Critics
can debate the merits of a film, musical composition or restaurant without ever
reaching a definite conclusion, because there is no external reality that makes
an aesthetic opinion true or false. Usually a list of the 100 "best" of anything
does not purport to reflect a fact, other than the author's feelings; to treat such
opinion as copyrightable content does not take anything of "the real world"
into the realm of property. It is just conceivable, however unlikely, that the
author of a price guide could defend his prices as nothing more than
expressions of taste. That, however, should be the issue, not whether the
prices are uncertain or opinionated. To be sure, there will be some cases
where it is difficult to separate taste from highly opinionated facts. Gorman's
example of the "fifty most liveable cities in America," 382 is an example. But if
the line drawing is difficult at least it conforms with the fundamental
principles of copyright laid down in Feist, and in many cases the distinction
can be resolved by looking at what the author purports to offer-a personal
reaction or a truth about the world.

IV.

CONCLUSION

One can argue, with some force, that facts should be subject to intellectual
property rights; 383 perhaps not exclusive rights that would bar the rediscovery
and use of facts by independent researchers, but at least rights that would
prevent the appropriation of labor, and imagination, by copying.'" Such rights
might encourage more research, and more publication of data, to the benefit of
everyone. But the law should be consistent. If, as the Supreme Court held in
Feist, facts are not copyrightable,38 5 soft facts should not be excepted without
both sound reasons and a principled methodology for drawing the distinction.
More importantly, if any kind of fact is to be made property, it should be only
after a thorough examination of the policies at stake, and a thorough
consideration of the appropriate measure of protection. It may well be that the
the "best" baseball players and the most "prominent" families are nothing more than expressions of
personal taste, then Feist would not stand in the way of copyright.
382. See supra note 360.
383. Such rights were the subject of bills in the 106th Congress. Collections of Information
Antipiracy Act, HR. 354, 106th Cong. (1999); Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of
1999, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).
384. Professor Denicola argued, prior to the Feist decision, that the public's interest in access to
information is largely protected if later authors can collect the same facts from the same sources as
prior authors, without actually copying from those prior authors. Denicola, supra note 5, at 541.
385. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991).
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optimal balance between access and incentives for facts, even opinionated
facts, would'be struck at a much shorter duration of monopoly than the life-ofthe-author-plus-seventy-years term that Congress has recently found
appropriate for copyrightable expression. 386 Until Feist is overruled, those
who "speak of the world" must allow their observations, like their ideas, to
become a 'part of the public domain available to every person,"' 38 7 reserving
to themselves only their manner of expression, of which they are genuinely the
"author."

386.

See Ginsburg, supra note 31, at 380-81.
Authorship is a complex, expandable, and changeable concept ....
[l]t is the
kind of determination better made by a body both [i.e., Congress] capable of
gathering and investigating facts that underlie assertions that a given product is
the "Writing" of an "Author," and attuned as a result of those investigations to
the economic and policy implications of inclusion or exclusion of the production
from the ambit of copyright.

Id.
387. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369

(5th Cir. 1981)).

